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ABSTRACT 
We treat judicial rulings, particularly those of the Supreme 
Court, as legitilnate sources of constitutional authority. But what if 
a decision rests on a plain misconception, expressed not in the 
holding of the case but in influential dicta, because the Court failed 
to properly understand a historical precedent? No matter how 
frequently courts, the Justice Department, and scholars later cite the 
dicta, a misrepresentation is not a valid source of authority. The 
responsible step for the Supreme Court is to revisit the mistake and 
correct it. This article focuses on the "sole organ" doctrine that 
appeared in United States v. Curtiss-Wright (1936). For nearly 
eight decades the Court allowed the error to persist as a source of 
presidential authority in external affairs. As a result of the author's 
amicus brief filed with the Court on July 17, 2014, concerning the 
case of Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Court was formally put on notice 
about the error. On June 8, 2015, the Court corrected the error 
while allowing other Curtiss-Wright errors to survive. The 
continuation of a judicial error for nearly eight decades 
de1nonstrates that the Court lacks a satL~jactory system for 
re1noving erroneous dicta that improperly magn~fied presidential 
power and damaged the constitutional system of checks and 
balances. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In its 2013 decision in Zivotof\'ky v. Secretary of State, the 
D.C. Circuit relied in substantial part on erroneous dicta included 
in the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp. ( 193() ). Although Curtiss- Wright concerned 
legislative- not presidential- authority, Justice George 
Sutherland added pages of extraneous material to concoct an 
array of independent, plenary, exclusive, and inherent powers for 
the President in external affairs. Sutherland wholly 
mischaracterized the "sole organ" speech given by John Marshall 
in lROO when he served in the House of Representatives, 
distorting his remarks to imply expansive presidential powers in 
external affairs. 
In fact, the purpose of Marshall's speech was to defend 
President John Adams for carrying out a treaty provision. Nothing 
in Marshall's sole-organ speech promoted or advocated 
independent presidential authority, yet Sutherland pressed that 
false doctrine. His error remained a potent factor after 193() in 
expanding presidential authority beyond its constitutional 
boundaries and weakening the system of checks and balances. As 
explained in this article, Sutherland advanced other 
misinterpretations in Curtiss-Wright, including the claim that 
treaty negotiation is assigned exclusively to the President and that 
sovereignty passed directly from the Crown to the United States. 
Scholars regularly called attention to defects in Sutherland's 
opinion, but the Supreme Court for 79 years failed! to correct his 
errors. 
This article highlights four broad issues about the judicial 
process: (1) the ease with which erroneous dicta appear in court 
decisions because they are added without guidance from briefs, 
oral argument, and the adversary process, (2) the pattern of dicta 
over time becoming accepted as the holding, (3) the distortions 
than can occur in presidential power because of erroneous dicta, 
and ( 4) the apparent inability of the Supreme Court to correct in 
timely manner erroneous dicta. The litigation process 
concentrates on misconceptions and errors in holdings, not dicta. 
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With Zivotoj.f.,,ky v. Kerry in 2015, the Court finally 
jettisoned the sole-organ doctrine. 1 It was always in the interest of 
the Court and the Nation to adhere to a judicial process that is 
thoughtful, informed, grounded, and principled, giving proper 
guidance to lower courts and the elected branches.2 As explained 
in Section XII of this article, in making a correction in Zivoto.fllky 
the Court left in place other erroneous dicta in Curtiss-Wright and 
created a new model of presidential power that seems close cousin 
to the sole-organ doctrine. 
I. THE JERUSALEM PASSPORT CASE 
On July 23, 2013, the D.C. Circuit held that congressional 
legislation in 2002 ''impermissibly infringes" on the President's 
power to recognize foreign governments.~ The court 
acknowledged that "[ n ]either the text of the Constitution nor 
originalist evidence provides much help in answering the question 
of the scope of the President's recognition power. "4 By what 
reasoning did the D.C. Circuit decide that an implied executive 
power to recognize foreign governments is superior to an implied 
power of Congress to formulate passport policy? 
On five occasions in its decision, the D.C. Circuit relied on 
erroneous dicta that appeared in the Supreme Court's 1936 ruling 
in Curtiss-Wright. 5 Quoting fron1 the Court's 1998 decision in 
Clinton v. City of New York/' the D.C. Circuit said the Court 
recognized that "in the foreign affairs arena, the President has 'a 
degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which 
would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved. "'7 
Citing Curtiss- Wright a second time, the D.C. Circuit claimed that 
the Supreme Court, "echoing the words of then-Congressman 
John Marshall, has described the President as the 'sole organ of 
the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with 
I. Zivotofsky ex rei. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 207() (2015). 
2. This article draws on the author's amicus hrid suhmitted to the Supreme Court 
on July 17, 2014, in Zivotof\·ky v. Kerry, http://www.loufisher.org/docs/pip/Zivotofsky.pdL 
3. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 725 F.3d 197, 220 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
4. /d. at 20n. 
5. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 2Y9 U.S. 304 (11)3n). 
n. 524 U.S. 417,445 (lYI)X). 
7. Zivotof~·ky, 725 F.3d at 211. 
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foreign nations. '"x The D.C. Circuit also cited United States v. 
Beltnont (1937), relying on Curtiss-Wright to claim that the 
President has authority to speak as the "sole organ" of the 
government in matters of recognition.9 Citing Belmont again, the 
D.C. Circuit referred to the Curtiss-Wright "sole organ'' 
doctrine. 10 Toward the end of its decision, the D.C. Circuit 
returned a fifth time to Curtiss- Wright to describe the President 
as the "sole organ of the nation in its external relations.'" 11 
With its dependence on Curtiss-Wright, the D.C. Circuit 
admitted it was placing confidence in judicial dicta rather than a 
judicial holding. Citing language from one of its decisions in 2006, 
it stated: "To be sure, the Court has not held that the President 
exclusively holds the power [of recognition]. But, for us- an 
inferior court- 'carefully considered language of the Supreme 
Court, even if technically dictum, generally must be treated as 
authoritative."' 12 That passage contains three qualifiers: carefully, 
considered, and generally. As will be explained, the dicta in 
Curtiss-Wright lacked care and consideration, as is every 
subsequent citation to the sole-organ argument. 
Referring to one of its decisions in 2010, the D.C. Circuit 
said that dictum is "especially" authoritative if the Supreme Court 
"has reiterated the same teaching." 13 Without doubt the Supreme 
Court has regularly cited the sole-organ doctrine from Curtiss-
Wright, but no matter how often the Court repeats an error it 
remains an error and should not be used to decide the scope of 
presidential constitutional authority. Errors, even with repetition, 
do not emerge as truth. 
II. CAVEATSABOUTDICTA 
A holding by the Supreme Court is subject to subsequent 
challenges, at times leading the Court to abandon an earlier 
holding as no longer valid. What of erroneous dicta? Are they 
H. !d. 
lJ. !d. (citing United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (llJ37)). 
10. ltf. at 213. 
11. ltf.at21lJ. 
12. !d. at 212 (emphasis in original), citing United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 
375 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
13. !d., citing Overhy v. Nat'! Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 5lJ5 F.3d 12lJO, 12lJ5 (D.C. Cir. 
2010). 
2016] STAYING POWER OF ERRONEOUS DICTA 153 
relatively easy to tuck into an opinion? If later discovered to be in 
error, is there a procedure to correct them? Do litigants ever pay 
attention to erroneous dicta? Is there a clear distinction between 
holdings and dicta? Those questions guide this section. 
Courts frequently resort to both holdings and dicta. No 
one expects that custom to end, even if the results can damage the 
development and reputation of law. After authoring Marbury v. 
Madison, 14 Chief Justice John Marshall expressed concern in 1821 
about the degree to which litigants read the decision carelessly, 
failing to separate its core holding from "some dicta of the 
Court." 15 When it became evident that attorneys were rummaging 
around Marbury to find nuggets favorable to their cause, he 
insisted that general expressions in a case "are to be taken in 
connection with the case in which those expressions are used," 
and if those expressions "go beyond the case, they may be 
respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent 
suit when the very point is presented for decision. " 1() A question 
before a court, he said, must be "investigated with care, and 
considered to its full extent." 17 In Marbury, the "single question" 
before the Court was "whether the legislature could give this 
Court original jurisdiction in a case in which the constitution had 
clearly not given it." tH That was the core holding. Everything else, 
including possible claims of judicial supremacy, amounted to 
dicta. Some of the language in Marbury was not only too broad, 
Marshall said, "but in some instances contradictory to its 
principle. ,p; 
Various efforts have been made to distinguish between 
acceptable and unacceptable dicta. In his book, The Nature of the 
Judicial Process (1921), Benjamin Cardozo noted that judges 
must decide cases ''swathed in obscuring dicta, which must be 
stripped off and cast aside."20 It was a "mystery'' to him how 
judges, "of all persons in the world, should put their faith in 
14. 5U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1X03). 
15. Cohcns v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 2M, 3l)l) (1X21). 
16. !d. 
17. !d. 
1 X. !d. at 400. 
l<J. !d. at 401. 
20. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 2l) (11)21). 
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dicta."21 There was a constant need to separate "the accidental 
and the non-essential from the essential and inherent. "22 
Writing for the Supreme Court in 1933, Justice Cardozo 
analyzed state court rulings in an effort to interpret a statute in 
Oklahoma. He remarked: "An opinion may be so framed that 
there is doubt whether the part of it invoked as an authority is to 
be ranked as a definitive holding or merely a considered 
dictum. "D The meaning of the latter term is developed in this 
statement: "At least it is considered dictum, and not comment 
merely obiter. "24 To Cardozo, a considered dictun1 is entitled to 
respect. In contrast, the erroneous dicta included by 1 ustice 
Sutherland in Curtiss-Wright cannot be described as considered, 
reasoned, studied, or a reliable source of law. It is not entitled to 
respect. 
A 1994 article by Michael Dorf defines dicta as 
"statements in a judicial opinion that are not necessary to support 
the decision reached by the court. A dictum is usually contrasted 
with a holding, a term used to refer to a rule or principle that 
decides the case. "25 He added: "It is a commonplace that holdings 
carry greater precedential weight than dicta, 'which may be 
followed if sufficiently persuasive but which are not 
controlling. "' 2h In the case of Sutherland's dicta in Curtiss-Wright, 
scholars have demonstrated for more than seven decades that his 
statements about presidential power in the field of external affairs 
are not persuasive. Nevertheless, the greater precedential weight 
in Curtiss- Wright has not been the holding but rather the dicta. 
A study by Michael Abramowicz and Maxwell Stearns in 
2005 relies on Black's Law Dictionary to define dictum "as a 
statement in a judicial opinion that is 'unnecessary' to the case 
resolution. "27 They define holding to consist of propositions and 
paths of reasoning that ''(1) are actually decided, (2) are based 
upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead to the judgment. If not a 
21. hi. 
22. /d. at 30. 
23. Hawks v. Hamill, 2HX U.S. 52, 5H-5Y (1 Y33). 
24. !d. at 5Y. 
25. Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article Ill, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 11Y7. 2000 (1YY4). 
26. !d. (citing Humphrey's Executor, 2(}5 U.S. 602,627 (1(}35)). 
27. Michael Ahramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. Y53, 
1056 (2005). 
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holding, a proposition stated in a case counts as dicta. "2x Their 
purpose is to develop clear distinctions between holdings and 
dicta to be applied to judicial rulings, with the former given 
dominant status. In Curtiss- Wright, Justice Sutherland's 
declarations about the sole-organ doctrine and other 
misconceptions should be considered not merely dicta but 
erroneous dicta. Yet federal courts, the elected branches, and 
some scholars regularly treated them as the holding. 
The overlap between dicta and holding is analyzed by 
Judith Stinson in an article in 2010. Despite much guidance from 
the legal profession, "lawyers and judges continue to confuse dicta 
for holding and holding for dicta. "2l) To the extent that courts treat 
dicta as holding, "they are more likely to reach incorrect 
decisions, to exceed their judicial authority, and to generate 
illegitimate results. ,:-;o That accurately summarizes the influence 
of Curtiss- Wright. Stinson observes that Supreme Court opinions 
"tend to be lengthy, allowing more space for extraneous 
commentary.":-; 1 No doubt about that. 
In defense of dicta, Foster Calhoun Johnson in 2012 
looked to dicta as "a unique tool for addressing injustice, without 
doing injustice," especially in cases involving equitable relief.:-12 
With regard to Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland's profound 
misconceptions and errors about plenary and exclusive 
presidential power have created a serious imbalance between the 
two elected branches in the field of foreign affairs. A 
concentration of power in one branch, the result not of 
constitutional grants but of judicial error, poses great risk of 
injustice. To Johnson, by employing dicta "to announce a 
prospective new rule, the court advances the interests of justice 
while reconciling tensions in legal doctrine.,:-;:-; Justice did not 
come from Sutherland's dicta in Curtiss-Wright. Johnson says that 
the virtue of dicta "is that it can correct the law without betraying 
2H. /d. at 1065. 
29. Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes 1/oldinf!, and Why It Matters, 76 BROOK. 
L. REV. 219, 220 (2010). 
30. /d. at 221. 
31. /d.at222. 
32. Foster Calhoun Johnson, Judicial Maf!,ic The Use of Dicta as fj'quitahle Remedy, 
46 U.S.F. L. Rl:V. HH3, HH9 (2012), emphasis in original. 
33. /d. at 900. 
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the law."34 That may occur in cases of equitable remedy. With 
regard to artificially inflated theories of presidential power, 
Sutherland's dicta betrayed the law and the Constitution. 
According to Johnson, dicta's virtue ''is precisely this: It corrects 
the law without betraying the law. '' 35 With Curtiss- Wright the law 
was not corrected. It was systematically undermined. 
Writing in 2006, Judge Pierre N. Leva] of the Second 
Circuit expressed concern that dicta "no longer have the 
insignificance they deserve. They are no longer ignored. Judges 
do more than put faith in them; they are often treated as binding 
law." The distinction between dictum and holding, he said, ''is 
more and more frequently disregarded."36 Although many agree 
that dictum does not establish binding law, "this rule is now 
honored in the breach with alarming frequency. "37 The 
acceptance of prior dicta as binding law "results in some part from 
time pressures on an overworked judiciary. "3K 
As to Supreme Court dicta, Judge Leval said it is 
"sometimes argued that the lower courts must treat the dicta of 
the Supreme Court as controlling,'' even though the Court's dicta 
"are not law."39 He explained why dicta can provide weak and 
misleading guides to the formation of law. First, courts are 
supposed to reach a decision after "confronting conflicting 
arguments powerfully advanced by both sides. When, however, 
the court asserts rules outside the scope of its judgment, that 
salutary adversity is often absent. "40 
As a second point, Judge Leva] cautioned that when a 
court asserts a rule of law in dictum, it "will often not have before 
it any facts affected by that rule. In addition, the lack of concrete 
facts increases the likelihood that readers will misunderstand the 
scope of the rule the court had in mind. "41 Third, another 
weakness of law made through dicta is that "there is no available 
correction mechanism. No appeal may be taken from the 
34. ld. at 930. 
35. ld. at 949. 
36. Pierre N. Leva!, Judging Under tlze Constitution: Dictu Ahout Dictu, K1 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1249, 1250 (200fl). 
37. ld. 
3K. ld. at 125fl. 
39. hi. at 1274. 
40. ld. at 12fl1. 
41. /d.at12fl2 
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assertion of an erroneous legal rule in dictum. Frequently, what's 
more, no party has a motive to try to get the bad proposition 
corrected. No party will even ask the court to reconsider its 
unfortunate dicta. "42 That has been the history of the sole-organ 
doctrine in Curtiss- Wright. Finally, Judge Leval recalled that his 
experience as a judge "has shown me that assertions made in 
dictum are less likely to receive careful scrutiny, both in the 
writing chambers and in the concurring chambers. When a panel 
of judges confers on a case, the judges generally focus on the 
outcome and on the reasoning upon which the outcome 
depends. . . . There is a high likelihood that peripheral 
observations, alternative explanations, and dicta will receive scant 
attention. "43 
Justice Robert Jackson once described the Supreme Court 
as having the final word: "We are not final because we are 
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final. "44 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist later described the Court's record with greater 
clarity and accuracy: "'It is an unalterable fact that our judicial 
system, like the human beings who administer it, is fallible." 45 A 
misrepresentation that appears in Curtiss- Wright is not a valid 
source of authority. Courts should not continue to cite an 
erroneous secondary source, even if it appears regularly in 
Supreme Court and lower court dicta. Instead, the Court should 
revisit a judicial mistake and correct it. 
The Supreme Court has a capacity to correct its errors, 
often within the space of three years, as it did with the compulsory 
flag-salute cases in 1940 and 1943.46 Interestingly, the Justice who 
wrote for the Court in the second case was Robert Jackson, clearly 
demonstrating that the Court is neither infallible nor final. The 
executive branch has a capacity to correct its errors. Solicitors 
General have confessed error in the Supreme Court 
approximately 250 times over the past century, with most of the 
42. !d. 
43. /d. 
44. Brown v. Alkn, 344 U.S. 443,540 (11)53). 
45. Herrera v. Collins, 50() U.S. 31)0, 415 (11)1)3). 
4o. Minersvilk Sch. Disl. v. Gohilis, 310 U.S. 5X6 (1lJ40); W. Virginia Slale Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barncllc, 319 U.S. o24 (11)43). 
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confessions involving criminal cases.47 A recent example is Acting 
Solicitor General Neal Katyal stating in 2011 that Solicitor 
General Charles Fahy in the Japanese-American cases during 
World War II failed to inform the Supreme Court about matters 
directly relevant to the cases of Gordon Hirabayashi and Fred 
Korematsu.4x 
The Supreme Court has available to it a procedure to 
revise its opinions to catch spelling errors, duplicate words, 
punctuation and spacing problems, citation form, and allow for 
word additions, deletions, and substitutions.49 In one case, the 
Supreme Court released an opinion that misstated who was 
President of the United States in 1799.50 With regard to erroneous 
dicta, the Supreme Court appears to have little process that 
enables it to publicly admit error and remove serious 
misconceptions from prior cases that distort the constitutional 
powers available to the President and weaken the system of 
checks and balances.51 
In an article in 2014, Judge Andrew D. I-Iurwitz of the 
Ninth Circuit could recall few judicial rulings "acknowledging 
common human error. '' 52 With regard to such errors, he wondered 
whether the authority of the Supreme Court in a recent case 
''would have suffered a whit had it just acknowledged its collective 
humanity. If one views the Supreme Court as Olympian, of 
course, failure to know everything is unthinkable."53 Whenever 
judges learn of significant mistakes that affect the outcome of a 
case, "there is value to correcting them transparentlly." Correcting 
errors, Judge Hurwitz points out, "is not only required to do 
justice, but reemphasizes a sad but important truth- that 
although almost all judges try very hard to do their best, we 
47. David M. Rosenzwcig, Confession of l~'rror in the Supreme Court hy the Solicitor 
General, X2 GEO. L.J. 2079, 20XO--Xl (1994). 
4K Ncal Kumar Katyal, The Solicitor General and Confession of Error, XI 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3027 (2013). 
49. Richard J. Lazarus, The (Non)f!nality ofSupreme Court Opinions, 12X HARV. L. 
RFV. 540,562-73 (2014). 
50. /d. at 567. 
51. Louis Fisher, Judicial Errors That Magnify Presidential Power, 61 FED. LAW. 66 
(Jan/Feb 2014). 
52. Andrew D. Hurwitz, When Judges Err: Is Confession Good for the Soul'! 56 
ARIZ. L. REV. 343, 344 (2014). 
53. !d. at 34X. See also Charles Rothfcld, Should the Supreme Court Correct Its 
Mistakes'!, 12X HARV. L. REV. FORUM 56 (2014). 
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sometimes fall short. More frequent admissions of human 
fallibility will increase the public appreciation of the role of the 
courts and their capacity for human error."54 
III. ERRONEOUS DICTA IN CURTISS-WRIGHT 
Writing for the Supreme Court in Curtiss- Wri[?ht, Justice 
George Sutherland introduced three conceptual and historical 
errors. First, he said that John Marshall during debate in the 
House of Representatives in 1800 described the President as the 
"sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole 
representative with foreign nations.'' 55 The word "sole" seems to 
suggest that the President has exclusive control over external 
affairs, including the recognition power, but clearly the Framers 
did not adopt William Blackstone's model that placed all of 
external affairs with the executive.56 Among other prerogatives, 
Blackstone recognized in the King the power to appoint 
ambassadors, make war, make treaties, issue letters of marque 
and reprisal, power to raise and regulate the military. and the 
power over domestic commerce.57 
The Constitution plainly vests those powers either 
expressly in Congress (declaring war, issuing letters of marque 
and reprisal, raising and regulating the military, and commerce) 
or assigns them jointly to the President and the Senate, as with 
treaties and appointing ambassadors. What did Marshall mean 
when he spoke during House debate in 1800? Did he believe that 
in the field of foreign affairs the President possessed exclusive, 
plenary, independent, and inherent power? By understanding 
Marshall's purpose in giving his speech, the answer is clearly no, 
a point underscored in Section IV. 
As a second error, Justice Sutherland claimed that the 
Constitution commits treaty negotiation exclusively to the 
President. That is incorrect, as the record plainly shows. Much of 
54. /d. C:lt351. 
55. Unitt.:d StC:ltt.:s v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 2()() U.S. at 31() (citing ANNALS, flth 
Cong., flB (1XOO)). 
5fl. LOUIS FISHER, THE LAW OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
2fl1-64 (2014); Rohcrt J. Rt.:instt.:in, The Umits ofErecutive /'ower, 5() AM. U. L. REV. 25(), 
2fl5-307 (200()). 
57. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON TilE LAWS OF ENGLAND 233, 
243, 24(), 250, 254, 2()() ( 17fl5). 
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Curtiss-Wright is devoted to his discussion about independent and 
inherent presidential powers in foreign affairs. Having made the 
distinction between external and internal affairs, he wrote: "In 
this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate 
and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to 
speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties 
with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. 
Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and 
Congress itself is powerless to invade it. "5x In his book published 
in 1919, Sutherland acknowledged that Senators do in fact 
participate in the negotiation phase and that Presidents often 
accede to this "'practical construction. "59 With regard to treaty-
making, he said the power of the Senate "is co-ordinate, 
throughout, with that of the President.60 
Many Presidents have invited not only Senators but 
members of the House of Representatives to participate in treaty 
negotiation. The purpose is to build political support in the Senate 
for the treaty and support in the House for authorization and 
appropriation bills needed to implement the treaty. In 1830, 
President Andrew Jackson submitted to the Senate 
"propositions'' for a treaty with the Choctaw Indians, seeking 
advice from Senators on a series of questions. He reached out to 
the Senate because "measures in this respect emanating from the 
united counsel of the treaty-making power would be more 
satisfactory to the American people and to the Indians. "h 1 
Similarly, President James K. Polk invited the Senate's 
advice on negotiating a treaty. He concluded that consulting with 
Senators in advance "upon important measures of foreign policy 
which may ultimately come before them for their consideration 
the President secures harmony of action between that body and 
himself. "h2 The negotiation of treaties is often shared with the 
Senate in order to build legislative understanding and support.r,3 
5X. 299 U.S. at ]19 (emphasis in original). 
59. GEORGE SlJT!IERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 122-
24 (1919). 
60. /d. at 12]. 
61. 4 J. EXEC. PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE lJ.S.A.9lJ (1XX7). 
62. 5 A COM PI! AriON OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 2299 
(James D. Richardson ed. IX97). 
6]. 2 GEORGE HENRY HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS 
HISTORY AND PRACTICE 576-602 (19]X). 
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No doubt a President may decide to exclude the Senate from the 
negotiating phase, as President Woodrow Wilson did with the 
Versailles Treaty, but his insistence on exclusive presidential 
control over negotiation ultimately failed when the Senate 
rejected the treaty. 64 
A constructive model of joint executive-legislative action 
appears in the legislative history of the United Nations Charter. 
Half of the eight members of the U.S. delegation that met in San 
Francisco in 1945 came from Congress: Senators Tom Connally 
(D-Tex.) and Arthur H. Vanderberg (R-Mich.) and 
Representatives Sol Bloom (D-N.Y.) and Charles A. Eaton (R-
N.J.).6::; Despite this ample record, the Office of Legal Counsel in 
2009 cited 1 ustice Sutherland's "clear dicta" in Curtiss- Wright that 
"[i]nto the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and 
Congress itself is powerless to invade it. "66 These statements, no 
matter how frequently and confidently expressed, have no 
relationship to the regular practice of treaty negotiation by both 
branches.67 
The third error that Sutherland included as dicta in 
Curtiss- Wright concerns his belief that when the United States 
separated from Great Britain the field of external sovereignty 
flowed directly from the Crown to the United States. That is false. 
States did possess and exercise sovereign powers. To reach his 
conclusion, Sutherland said that after the Declaration of 
Independence "the powers of external sovereignty passed from 
the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their 
collective and corporate capacity as the United States of 
64. Wilson's belief in presidential monopoly of treaty negotiation has been 
decisively refuted by scholars. See Forrest R. Black, The United States Senate and the Treaty 
Power, 4 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. I (1931 ); William Whitwell Dewhurst, Does the 
Constitution Make the President Sole Negotiator of Treaties?, 30 YALE L.J. 47X (1921); 
Louis Fisher, Congressional Participation in the Treaty Process, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1511 
(19X9); Richard E. Webb, Treaty-Making and the President's Ohligation to Seek the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate with Special Reference to the Vietnam Peace Negotiations, 31 
0~110 ST. L..J. 490 (1970). 
65. The Charter of the United Nations: Hearings Reji1re the S. Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 644 ( 1945). 
66. Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum Opinion ./(1r the Acting Legal Adviser, 
Department of State, June 1, 2009, at 9, hllp://www.justice.gov/sites/defaulllfiks/olc/ 
opinions/2009/()fl/31 /section 7()54. pdf. 
o7. FISHER, supra note 56, at 210, 272-7o, 2X6. 
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America."6x By transferring external or foreign affairs directly to 
the national government and associating foreign affairs with the 
executive, Sutherland positioned himself to advance a broad 
definition of inherent presidential power. 
There are multiple problems with Sutherland's analysis. 
External sovereignty did not circumvent the colonies and the 
independent states and pass directly to the national government. 
When Great Britain entered into a peace treaty with America, the 
provisional articles of November 30, 1782 were not with a national 
government because a national government did not yet exist. 
Instead, "His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United 
States, viz. New-Hampshire, Massachusetts-Bay, Rhode-Island 
and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-
Jersey, Pensylvania [sic], Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-
Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia," referring to them as 
"free, sovereign and independent States. "69 The colonies formed 
a Continental Congress in 1774. It provided a form of national 
government until passage of the Articles of Confederation, 
ratified in 17~H, and adoption of the U.S. Constitution. 
Until that time, the states operated as sovereign entities in 
making treaties and exercising other powers that would pass to 
the new national government in 1789. The Supreme Court has 
frequently recognized that the American colonies, upon their 
separation from England, exercised the powers of sovereign and 
independent governments. 70 Sovereignty and external affairs did 
not pass from Great Britain to the U.S. President. In 1776, at the 
time of America's break with England, there was no President 
and no separate executive branch. Only one branch of 
government-the Continental Congress-functioned at the 
national level. It carried out all governmental powers, including 
legislative, executive, and judicial.71 When the new national 
government under the lJ .S. Constitution began in 1789, sovereign 
powers were not placed solely in the President. They were divided 
6X. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 316. 
69. U.S.-U.K., art. I, Nov. 30, 17X2, X Stat. 55. 
70. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19,31 (1947); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 
725 (1X69); M'IIvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, X U.S. (4 Cranch) 209,212 (1XOX); Ware v. Hylton, 
3 U.S. (3 Dati.) 199,222--24 (1796). 
71. LOlJIS FISH!·R, PRESIDl'NT AND CONGRESS: POWER AND POLICY 1-27, 253-70 
(1972). 
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between Congress and the President, with ultimate sovereignty 
vested in the people. As explained in Section IX, many scholars 
have rejected Sutherland's theory about external sovereignty. 
IV. PLACING DICTA IN PROPER CONTEXT 
John Marshall's speech about the President as "sole 
organ" can only be understood by reading it in full and 
appreciating the political circumstances. In 1800, Thomas 
Jefferson campaigned for President against John Adams. 
Jeffersonians in the House urged that President Adams be either 
impeached or censured for turning over to Great Britain an 
individual charged with murder. Because the case was already 
pending in an American court, some lawmakers wanted to 
sanction Adams for encroaching upon the judiciary and violating 
the doctrine of separation of powers. A House resolution 
described the decision to turn the accused over to the British as 
"a dangerous interference of the Executive with Judicial 
decisions. "72 According to the resolution, the decision to release 
the individual to the British "exposes the administration thereof 
to suspicion and reproach. "73 Some lawmakers "had no doubt of 
the competency of the House either to impeach, to censure, or to 
approbate the conduct of the Executive ... "74 
There was disagreement about the nationality of the 
person released to the British. The House resolution began with 
these words: "it appears to this House that a person, calling 
himself Jonathan Robbins, and claiming to be a citizen of the 
United States," was held on a British ship and committed to trial 
in the United States "for the alleged crime of piracy and murder, 
committed on the high seas, on board the British frigate 
Hermione."75 Notice the language: it appears. What were the 
facts? Robbins said he was from Danbury, Connecticut, but 
citizens living there certified they had never known an inhabitant 
of the town "by the name of Jonathan or Nathan Robbins, and 
that there has not been nor now is any family known by the name 
72. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 533 (1X00). 
73. /d. 
74. !d. at 553 (Rt.:p. Bayard). 
75. /d. at 532. 
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of Robbins within the limits of said town."76 Secretary of State 
Timothy Pickering concluded that Robbins was using an assumed 
name and was actually Thomas Nash, a native Irishman.77 U.S. 
District Judge Thomas Bee, who was asked to turn the prisoner 
over to the British, agreed that the individual was Thomas Nash. 7x 
Marshall took the floor to methodically shred the call for 
impeachment or censure. The Jay Treaty with England contained 
an extradition provision in Article 27, providing that each country 
deliver up to each other ''all persons" charged with murder or 
forgery?> President Adams was not making foreign policy 
unilaterally. He was not the "sole organ" in formulating the 
treaty. He was the sole organ in implementing it. Adams was 
fulfilling his Article II, Section 3, authority to take care that the 
laws, including treaties, be faithfully executed. Under Article VI 
of the Constitution, all treaties "shall be the supre1me Law of the 
Land." 
Marshall explained that the President "is charged to 
execute the laws. A treaty is declared to be a law. He must then 
execute a treaty, where he, and he alone, possesses the means of 
executing it. ''xo As to executive-judicial relationships, Marshall 
said if President Adams had ''directed the Judge at Charleston to 
decide for or against his own jurisdiction, to condemn or acquit 
the prisoner, this would have been a dangerous interference with 
judicial decisions, and ought to have been resisted. "x 1 There was 
no such interference. National policy for external affairs would be 
made by the two branches jointly, in this case by treaty and in 
other cases by statute. At no point did Marshall suggest that the 
President possessed some kind of exclusive authority over foreign 
affairs. After Marshall completed his presentation, Jeffersonians 
considered his argument so tightly reasoned it could not be 
refuted.x2 
76. /d. at 517. 
77. /d. at 515. 
7X. /d. Sec Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Rohhins, 
100 YALE L..J. 22Y (IYYO). On page 310, Wcdgwood states that the defendant was not 
"Jonathan Rohhins," an American, hut rather Thomas Nash, an Irishman. 
7Y. Treaty on Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-U.K., Nov. lY, 17Y4, X Stat. 
12Y. 
XO. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (IXOO). 
XI. /d.at615~16. 
X2. Marshall's speech is availahk at http://loufisher.org/docs/pip/444.pdf. 
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In its February 2014 brief to the Supreme Court in 
Zivotol\'ky, the Justice Department presented incoherent 
arguments on the relative powers of Congress and the President 
in external affairs. In some places the Department claimed the 
President has "plenary and exclusive power* * *as the sole organ 
of the federal government in the field of international relations," 
citing Curtiss- Wright.x3 Yet the Department also acknowledged 
that "the two Branches exercise some foreign-affairs powers 
jointly," including the power to make and execute treaties and the 
Article I, § 8, cl. 3 power of Congress "to regulate foreign 
commerce and the value of foreign currency."x4 Elsewhere the 
Department stated that Congress "also possesses the power to 
regulate passports pursuant to its enumerated powers. "x5 Oddly, 
it then concluded that an enumerated power of Congress cannot 
control the President's implied power over recognition policy. 
The Department's brief offered additional Article I support for 
the power of Congress in external affairs, such as its powers to 
regulate immigration.x6 Section XI examines the Justice 
Department's position in greater detail. 
V. CURTISS-WRIGHT INVOLVED LEGISLATIVE, NOT 
PRESIDENTIAL, POWER 
The Supreme Court's decision in Curtiss- Wright became a 
standard citation for the "sole organ" doctrine and the existence 
of inherent, exclusive executive power in the field of foreign 
affairs. The word "sole" appears to be synonymous with plenary 
and exclusive, but what is meant by "organ"? An independent 
executive policy-maker or simply the medium used by Presidents 
in communicating with other countries? To answer that question, 
one has to read John Marshall's speech in full to put "sole organ" 
in proper context. 
The case itself did not concern independent or plenary 
presidential power. The issue before the judiciary was whether 
Congress had delegated legislative authority too broadly when it 
K3. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, at 13, 23, Zivotofsky ex rei. Zivotofsky 
v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) (No. 13-62X), 2014 WL 71K600. 
K4. /d. at 13. 
K5. !d. at 10. 
K6. /d. at 22. 
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authorized the President to declare an arms embargo in South 
America. A joint resolution by Congress authorized the President 
to prohibit the sale of arms in the Chaco region whenever he 
found that it "may contribute to the reestablish1nent of peace" 
between belligerents.x7 
In imposing the embargo, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt relied solely on statutory-not inherent executive-
authority. His proclamation prohibiting the sale of arms and 
munitions to countries engaged in armed conflict in the Chaco 
began: "NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, acting 
under and by virtue of the authority conferred in Jne by the said 
joint resolution of Congress, ... ''xx The proclarnation did not 
assert the existence of any inherent, independent, plenary, 
exclusive, or extra-constitutional presidential power. 
Litigation on the proclamation focused on legislative 
power because, during the previous year, the Supreme Court in 
two cases had struck down the delegation by Congress of domestic 
power to the President.x9 The issue in Curtiss- Wright was 
therefore whether Congress could delegate legislative power 
more broadly in international affairs than it coulld in domestic 
affairs. A district court, holding that the joint resolution 
represented an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
authority, said nothing about any reservoir of inherent 
presidential power.90 It acknowledged the '"traditional practice of 
Congress in reposing the widest discretion in the Executive 
Department of the government in the conduct of the delicate and 
nicely posed issues of international relations. "91 Recognizing that 
need, however, did not justify for the district court the delegation, 
nor did it recognize any broad capacity of the President as "sole 
organ" in external affairs. 
The district court decision was taken directly to the 
Supreme Court. None of the briefs on either side discussed the 
availability of independent or inherent powers for the President. 
K7. Joint Resolution, Puh. L. No. 73-2K, ch. 365, 4K Stat. XII (1934). 
KK. 4K Stat. 1745. 
K9. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 3KK (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. 
v. United States, 295 lJ.S. 4Y5 (1935). 
90. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1936). 
91. /d. at 240. 
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To the Justice Department, regarding the issue of jurisdiction, the 
question for the Court went to "the very power of Congress to 
delegate to the Executive authority to investigate and make 
findings in order to implement a legislative purpose. "l):: Its brief 
focused on whether the district court erred in holding that the 
joint resolution "constitutes an improper delegation of legislative 
power to the President. "l)3 The government argued that previous 
decisions by the Supreme Court, including those in the field of 
foreign relations, supported the delegation of this "legislative 
power to the President. "l)4 Past delegations covering the domain 
of foreign relations represented "a valid exercise of legislative 
authority. "l)5 The joint resolution, said the government, contained 
adequate standards to guide the President and did not fall prey to 
the "unfettered discretion" found by the Court in the 1935 
Panama Refining and Schechter decisions.% The government's 
brief consistently regarded the source of authority as legislative, 
not executive. 
The brief for the private company, Curtiss-Wright, also 
concentrated on the issue of delegated legislative power and did 
not explore the existence of independent or inherent presidential 
power. The brief charged that the joint resolution (1) represented 
an unlawful delegation of legislative power, (2) did not go into 
operation because the President's proclamation failed to contain 
all the findings required by the joint resolution, (3) the President 
could not have consulted other governments as contemplated by 
the joint resolution, and ( 4) the effect of the President's second 
proclamation of November 14, 1935, extinguished the alleged 
liability of private companies involved in selling arms and 
92. Statement as to Jurisdiction at 7, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 
U.S. 304 (1936) (No. 9X), signed hy Martin Conboy, Special Assistant to the Attorney 
General of the United States, reprinted in 32 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND AR(ilJMENTS OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW XLJX (Philip B. 
Kurland & Gerhard Casper, eds., 1975) !hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS!. 
93. Brief for the United States at 2, United Stales v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 29() 
U.S. 304 (193o) (No. ()X), reprinted in 32 LANDMARK BRIEFS ()On. 
94. !d. at6, reprinted in 32 LANDMARK BRIEFS ()10. 
()5. !d. at X, reprinted in 32 LANDMARK BRII:Fs ()12. 
96. /d. at 1o, reprinted in 32 LANDMARK BRIEFS 920. 
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munitions abroad.97 A separate brief, prepared for other private 
parties, also analyzed the delegation of legislative power.9x 
Writing for the Court in Curtiss- Wright, Justice 
Sutherland reversed the district court and upheld the delegation 
of legislative power to the President to place an embargo on arms 
or munitions to the Chaco. To Sutherland, the two categories of 
external and internal affairs are different ''both in respect of their 
origin and their nature.'' 99 The principle that the federal 
government is limited to either enumerated or implied powers "is 
categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs." 100 The 
purpose, he said, was "to carve from the general mass of 
legislative powers then possessed by the states such portions as it 
was thought desirable to vest in the federal government, leaving 
those not included in the enumeration still in the states." 101 But 
that doctrine, Sutherland insisted, "applies only to powers which 
the states had ... since the states severally never possessed 
international powers .... " 102 
In CurtL,·s- Wright, Sutherland quotes John ~v1arshall out of 
context, implying a scope of presidential power that Marshall 
never embraced. Marshall said during House debate: "The 
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, 
and its sole representative with foreign nations.''' 103 Sutherland 
developed for the President a source of power in foreign affairs 
that was not grounded in authority delegated by Congress or 
extended to the President either expressly or by implication in the 
Constitution: 
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not 
alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion 
of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very 
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the 
sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
!J7. Brief for Appellees, Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp. and Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor 
Co., Inc. at 3, United Stales v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 2!)!) U.S. :104 (1!)36) (No. !JX), 
reprinted in 32 LANDMARK BRIEFS !)37. 
9X. Brief for Appellees JohnS. Allard, Clarence W. Webster & Samuel J. Ahclow 
at3-5, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 29!) U.S. 304 (1!J36) (No. !JX), reprinted 
in 32 LANDMARK BRIEFS 979-X1. 
!J!J. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 29!) U.S. 304,315 (1936). 
100. /d.at316. 
101. !d. (emphasis in original). 
102. !d. 
103. !d. at 31!J. 
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international relations-a power which docs not require as a 
basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, 
like every other governmental power, must he exercised in 
subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. 
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our 
international relations, embarrassment-perhaps serious 
embarrassment-is to be avoided and success for our aims 
achieved, congressional legislation which is to he made 
effective through negotiation and inquiry within the 
international field must often accord to the President a degree 
of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which 
would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone 
involved. 104 
In liberating the President from statutory grants of power and 
legislative restrictions, Justice Sutherland did not explain how the 
exercise of presidential power would be constrained by requiring 
that it "be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions 
of the Constitution." Which provisions in the Constitution could 
check or override presidential decisions? On that fundamental 
issue he was silent. Justice McReynolds' dissent was brief: ''He is 
of opinion that the court below reached the right conclusion and 
its judgment ought to be affirmed." 105 
Justice Stone did not participate. He later wrote to Edwin 
M. Borchard, a prominent law professor: "I have always regarded 
it as something of a misfortune that I was foreclosed from 
expressing my views in ... Curtiss-Wright . .. because I was ill and 
away from the Court when it was decided." 10h In another letter to 
Borchard, Stone said he "should be glad to be disassociated" with 
Sutherland's opinion. 107 Borchard advised Stone that the Court, in 
such cases as Curtiss-Wright, "has attributed to the Executive far 
more power than he had ever undertaken to claim." 10x 
In discussing Marshall's 1800 speech in Curtiss- Wright, 
Justice Sutherland did not engage merely in dicta. He committed 
plain judicial error, yet his language is routinely cited by the 
104. /d. at 319-20. 
105. /d. at 333. 
106. Letter from Harlan F. Stone .1., to Edwin M. Borchard, Professor at Yale lJniv. 
School of Law (Fch. 11, 1942) (on file at Papers of Harlan Fiske Stone, Container No.6, 
Manuscript Room, Lihrary of Congress). 
107. Letter from Stone .1., to Borchard (May 13, 1937) (on file al Papers of Harlan 
Fiske Stone, Container No.6, Manuscript Room, Lihrary of Congress). 
lOX. Letter from Borchard, to Stone .I. (Fch. 9, 1942) (on file at Papers of Harlan 
Fiske Stone, Container No.6, Manuscript Room, Lihrary of Congress). 
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Supreme Court, lower courts, the Justice Department, and 
various scholars. They do not read the entire speech to 
understand the breadth of Sutherland's misinterpretation and 
deliberate effort, through deceit, to inflate presidential power in 
foreign affairs. One of the weaknesses of the judilcial process is 
that once a historical misconception enters a decision, including 
one by the Supreme Court, it can remain there for decades and be 
cited repeatedly as an authoritative source without any steps to 
correct the error. Any institution, including the federal judiciary, 
is damaged publicly and internally when it lacks the capacity to 
identify and rectify mistakes. 
VI. JUDICIAL MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT HISTORY 
How could Justice Sutherland err on so many occasions in 
Curtiss- Wright about Marshall's sole-organ speech, the treaty 
negotiation process, and how external sovereignty came to the 
United States? His misrepresentations about history have quite a 
bit of judicial company. An article by Justice Robert Jackson in 
1945 observed: "Judges often are not thorough or objective 
historians." 10l) When Justices fall short in understanding history, 
how can they rely on the school of originalism in deciding 
constitutional cases? Seeking principles from the nation's 
founding has broad appeal, but this type of analysis can offer 
evidence on both sides of an issue, inviting Justices to arbitrarily 
pick one side over another. Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III notes 
that federal judges "are neither trained nor equipped to conduct 
this type of inquiry." 110 Judges "lifted high by the lofty promises 
of originalism are laid bare to the insidious temptations of 
personal preference." 111 
Charles A. Miller, in his study of judicial dependence on 
history, offered this judgment: "[T]he Supreme Court as a whole 
cannot indulge in historical fabrication without thereby appearing 
to approve the deterioration of truth as a criterion for 
109. Rohcrt H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit- The Lawyer's Clause of' tht' 
Constitution, 45 COLlJM. L. REV. I,() (1945). . 
I 10. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY 
AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 50 (2012). 
111. !d. at 57. 
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communication in public affairs." 112 When the Court errs in 
judging history, "this is seldom due to a simple misstatement of 
verifiable fact. Rather, the Court's history is misleading in its 
interpretation. '' 113 When Senator Claude Pepper participated in 
oral argument at the Supreme Court, he appealed to the historical 
record "because when this great tribunal declares the law we all 
bow to it; but history remains history, in spite of judicial 
utterances upon the subject." 114 
Writing in 1965, Alfred H. Kelly described the Court's 
role as constitutional historian as "if not a naked king, no better 
than a very ragged one. From a professional point of view, most, 
if not all, of its recent historical essays are very poor indeed." 115 
Too often Justices "reach conclusions that are plainly 
erroneous." 116 The Court is not likely to receive reliable guidance 
from briefs submitted to it. Attorneys who prepare briefs "do not 
attempt to present a court with balanced and impartial statements 
of truth .... The object of this process is not objective truth, 
historical or otherwise, but advocacy-i.e., the assertion of a 
client's interests" 117 
In an article on originalism in 1989, Justice Antonin Scalia 
remarked that the judicial system "does not present the ideal 
environment for entirely accurate historical inquiry." 11 x Referring 
to the experience and scholarly background of his own staff, he 
said courts do not "employ the ideal personnel." 119 Moreover, 
Scalia noted, the "inevitable tendency of judges to think that the 
law is what they would like it to be will, I have no doubt, cause 
most errors in judicial historiography to be made in the direction 
of projecting upon the age of 1789 current, modern values .... " 120 
Justice John Paul Stevens, in a book published in 2011, wrote that 
"judges are merely amateur historians" whose interpretations of 
112. CHARLES A. MILU:R, THF SUPREME COURT AND Till' USES OF HISTORY 195 
(1969). 
113. !d. 
114. /d.at196. 
115. Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit IAJVe Affair, 1905 St !P. Cr. REV. 
119, 155. 
116. !d. 
117. /d.at!SS-56. 
!IX. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The IA:'sser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. RI.V. X49, X61 
( 19X9). 
119. !d. 
120. !d. at X64. 
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past events, "like their interpretations of legislative history, are 
often debatable and sometimes simply wrong. " 121 
Judge Wilkinson underscores judicial limitations in 
understanding matters of history. He explains that historians 
spend years studying a period of time ''and investigating its 
nuances," while judges have only months to decide each case "and 
even that time has to be divided among all the cases on the 
docket." 122 History professors, he points out, have the benefit of 
research assistants trained in the tools of historical research. 
Judges have their law clerks, "and although these newly minted 
lawyers are intelligent and capable, they are typically unversed in 
the historian's methods." 123 
Granted these limitations, if federal judges decide to 
characterize the speech by John Marshall in 1800, it is 
unacceptable to mechanically repeat what other courts have said 
about the sole-organ doctrine. There is an obligation on the part 
of a judge, assisted by a law clerk, to actually read the speech and 
reach an informed understanding. Students in undergraduate 
schools are required to do that. Students in my classes at the 
William and Mary Law School read Marshall's speech and fully 
understand that Justice Sutherland in Curtiss- Wright 
fundamentally misrepresented it. 124 No one reading Marshall's 
speech could possibly conclude that he promoted unilateral, 
inherent, plenary, and exclusive powers of the President in 
external affairs. Judicial misconceptions and errors about history 
are serious because, once uttered, they are likely to be cited on a 
regular basis as reliable precedents. Section VIII illustrates the 
extent to which the errors in Curtiss- Wright have become 
embedded in American law. 
VII. SUTHERLAND'S POLITICAL VIEWS AS U.S. 
SENATOR 
There was no need for the Supreme Court in 1936 to 
explore the existence of independent, inherent, or exclusive 
121. JUSTICE JOHN PAULSTFVFNS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 225-
26 (2011 ). 
122. WILKINSON. supra note 110, at 50-51. 
123. !d. at 51. 
124. Jamie Schuman, Brief of the Week: Can the Supreme Coun Correct lc'rroneous 
Dicta?, NAT'L L. .1., Nov. J, 2014, http://www.loufishcr.org/docs/pip/fishcrhricf.pdf. 
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presidential powers in foreign affairs. Nevertheless, in extensive 
dicta, the decision for the Court by Justice Sutherland went far 
beyond the specific issue before the Court and discussed extra-
constitutional powers of the President. Many of the themes in the 
decision were drawn from Sutherland's writings as a U.S. Senator 
from Utah (1905-17) and his book, Constitutional Power and 
World A.ff'airs, published two years after he left the Senate. 
According to Joel Francis Paschal, Sutherland "had long been the 
advocate of a vigorous diplomacy which strongly, even 
belligerently, called always for an assertion of American rights. It 
was therefore to be expected that [Woodrow] Wilson's cautious, 
sometimes pacifistic, approach excited in him only contempt and 
disgust." 125 
Sutherland served in the Senate from March 4, 1905, to 
March 3, 1917, gaining experience as a member of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. His opinion in Curtiss-Wright 
draws from his article, "The Internal and External Powers of the 
National Government," printed as a Senate document in 1910. 126 
The article began with this fundamental principle: "That this 
Government is one of limited powers, and that absolute power 
resides nowhere except in the people, no one whose judgment is 
of any value has ever seriously denied .... " 127 
Yet subsequent analysis in the article moved in the 
direction of independent presidential power that could not be 
checked or limited by other branches, even by the people's 
representatives in Congress. He first faulted other studies for 
failing "to distinguish between our internal and our external 
relations." 12x With regard to external relations, Sutherland argued 
that after the Declaration of Independence, the American 
colonies lost their character as free and independent states and 
that national sovereignty passed directly to the central 
government. 12l) Sutherland's article in 1910 connected external 
matters with the national government, 130 but in Curtiss-Wright he 
125. JOEL FRANCIS PASCIIAL, MR. JLJSTICT SUTIIERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE 
STATE93 (1951). 
126. S. Doc. No. 61-417, 61st (\mg., 2tl Sess. (1910). 
127. /d. at I (emphasis in original). 
12X. /d. (emphases in original). 
129. /d. 
130. /d. al 12. 
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associated national sovereignty and external affairs with the 
presidency, greatly expanding executive power. In addition to 
identifying express and implied constitutional powers in his 
article, Sutherland spoke of "inherent" powers and "extra-
constitutional'' powers. 131 
The same themes appear in Sutherland's book, 
Constitutional Power and World Affairs, published in 1919. He 
again distinguishes between internal and external powers 132 and 
insists that in carrying out military operations the President ''must 
be given a free, as well as a strong hand. The contingencies of war 
are limitless- beyond the wit of man to foresee .... To rely upon 
the slow and deliberate processes of legislation, after the situation 
and dangers and problems have arisen, may be to court danger-
perhaps overwhelming disaster. " 133 Earlier in the book he warned 
against "the danger of centralizing irrevocable and absolute 
power in the hands of a single ruler" 134 and said that in "all matters 
of external sovereignty'' with regard to the general government 
the "result does not flow from a claim of inherent power. " 135 
He expressed concern that the office of the President "has 
grown in potency and influence to an extent never dreamed of by 
those who framed and adopted the Constitution," leading to 
subsequent thoughts of the President "as a superior officer rather 
than as a co-equal member of a tripartite organization." 130 Under 
these pressures, Congress would be "driven from its traditional 
and constitutional place in public thought, as a co-ordinate branch 
of the government." 137 After spending twelve years in the U.S. 
Senate and penning these thoughts in his book, why would he 
later, in Curtiss- Wright, promote presidential power in external 
affairs as "plenary and exclusive"? 
Later passages of the book vested in the President as 
Commander-in-Chief a power that is supreme: "Whatever any 
Commander-in-Chief may do under the laws and practices of war 
as recognized and followed by civilized nations, may be done by 
131. /d. at X-LJ. 
132. SUTIIERLAND, supra note 5<), at 26. 
LB. !d. at Ill. 
134. !d. at 25. 
135. !d. at 47. 
136. !d. at 75. 
137. !d. at 76. 
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the President as Commander-in-Chief. In carrying on hostilities 
he possesses sole authority, and is charged with sole 
responsibility, and Congress is excluded from any direct 
interference."ux In time of war, Sutherland concluded that 
traditional rights and liberties had to be relinquished: ''individual 
privilege and individual right, however dear or sacred, or however 
potent in normal times, must be surrendered by the citizen to 
strengthen the hand of the government lifted in the supreme 
gesture of war. Everything that he has, or is, or hopes to be-
property, liberty, life-may be required." 13() Statutes enacted 
during World War I, Sutherland said, invested President Wilson 
"with virtual dictatorship over an exceedingly wide range of 
subjects and activities." 140 Sutherland spoke of the need to define 
the powers of external sovereignty as ''unimpaired" and 
"unquestioned. " 141 
VIII. HOW COURTS COMPOUND JUDICIAL ERRORS 
Anthony Simones, after reviewing the academic literature 
and judicial decisions following Justice Sutherland's opinion, 
concluded that "for every scholar who hates Curtiss- Wright, there 
seems to exist a judge who loves it.'' 142 The litigation record fully 
supports that observation. Courts and executive officials 
repeatedly cite Curtiss- Wright favorably, not only to sustain 
delegations of legislative power but to support the existence of 
inherent and exclusive presidential power in foreign affairs. 
Robert Jackson, as Attorney General, relied on Curtiss-
Wright to defend the destroyers-bases agreement entered into by 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1940. 14 :-~ In doing so, he drew 
some boundaries to cabin executive power: "The President's 
power over foreign relations while 'delicate, plenary, and 
exclusive' is not unlimited. Some negotiations involve 
commitments as to the future which would carry an obligation to 
11X. /d. at 74-75. 
139. /d. at 9X. 
140. /d. at 115. 
141. /d. at 171. 
142. Anthony Simonl:s, The Reality of Curtiss-Wright, 16 N. ILL U. L. REV. 411,415 
(1996). 
143. 39 OPS. ArT'Y GEN. 4X4, 4X6-X7 (1941). 
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exercise powers vested in the Congress." 144 Two years later, in a 
case involving an executive agreement between President 
Roosevelt and Russia, the Supreme Court cited Curtiss- Wright 
and the "sole organ'' doctrine, but described the President as 
acting under "a modest implied power," not an inherent power. 145 
In the Nazi Saboteur Case of 1942, the Court spoke of the 
need to treat statutory grants of authority to the President as 
being ''entitled to the greatest respect. " 146 For that proposition it 
referred to three cases, including Curtiss-Wright. 147 At issue, 
however, was authority granted by Congress, not some type of 
plenary or exclusive presidential power. In one of the Japanese-
American cases, the Court looked to Curtiss- Wright to support 
the granting of broad powers to the President during time of 
war. 14x The Court relied on Sutherland's opinion to sustain the 
delegation of legislative power, not the existence of independent, 
exclusive, or inherent presidential power. 
In 1948, the Court decided that presidential actions in 
authorizing applications by carriers engaged in overseas air 
transportation were beyond the competence of courts to review. WJ 
The President acted under a provision of the Civil Aeronautics 
Act. The Court's opinion, written by Justice Jackson, cited 
Curtiss- Wright and adopted much of its language, but the thrust 
of the decision was to remove the judiciary- not Congress- from 
such questions: 
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the 
Nation's organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence 
services whose reports are not and ought not to be published 
to the world. It would be intolerable that courts, without the 
relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions 
of the Executive taken on information properly held secret. 
Nor can courts sit in camera in order to be taken into executive 
confidences. But even if courts could require full disclosure, the 
very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is 
political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our 
Constitution to the political departments of the government, 
144. !d. at 41-17. 
145. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,229 (1942). Curtiss-Wright was also cited in 
United States v. Belmont. 301 U.S. 324.331-32 (1937). 
1411. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I, 41-42 (llJ42). 
147. /d. at 42. 
141-1. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 21-\J, 291-1 n.21 (1944). 
14lJ. Chi. &S. Air Lines v. Waterman S. S. Corp., JJJ U.S. 103 (1941-1). 
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Executive and Legislative. They arc delicate, complex, and 
involve large elements of prophecy. They arc and should be 
undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people 
whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a 
kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor 
responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the 
domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or 
inquiry. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454; United States v. 
Curtiss- Wright Corp., 299 lJ .S. 304, 319-321; Oet;en v. Central 
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302. L'io 
When Justice Jackson wrote those words, courts had in fact been 
hearing executive confidences in camera as part of a judge's duty 
to determine what evidence could be admitted at trial. 151 
Moreover, in subsequent years Congress specifically authorized 
federal courts to receive confidential documents from the 
executive branch and examine them in camera. 152 
In a military tribunal case decided in 1948, Justice Douglas 
wrote in a concurrence: "The President is the sole organ of the 
United States in the field of foreign relations. See United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318-321. Agreements which 
he has made with our Allies in furtherance of our war efforts have 
been legion. Whether they are wise or unwise, necessary or 
improvident, are political questions, not justiciable ones. " 153 As 
with Justice Jackson, this passage appears to exclude the judiciary, 
not Congress, and does not seem to endorse unlimited, unchecked 
presidential actions taken pursuant to inherent powers. 
In 1950, the Court used Curtiss-Wright to support an 
inherent presidential power to exclude Ellen Knauff, a German 
citizen married to an American soldier. The case involved 
questions of statutory authority and agency regulations adopted 
150. /d. at 111. 
151. Haugen v. United States, 153 F.2d X50, X51 (9th Cir. 194A). 
152. E.g., Act of Oct. 15, 19XO, 94 Stat. 2025 ( 19XO) (the Classified Information Act of 
19XO authorizes trial judges to rule on classified information in camna heforc the 
defendant attL:mpts to introduce evidence in open court); Act of Nov. 21, 1lJ74, XX Stat. 
15()2 (1974) (to amend section 552 of title 5, United States Code, known as the Freedom 
of Information Act) (a district court has jurisdiction "to enjoin the agency from 
withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly 
withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court ... may examine the contents of 
such agency records in camera .. .''); Ronald M. Levin, In Camera Inspections Under the 
Freedom oflnf(Jrnwtion Act, 41 U. C111. L. RFV. 557 (1974). 
153. Hirota v. MacArthur, 33X U.S. 1lJ7, 20X (IY4X) (Douglas, J., concurring, 
announced on June 27, 1Y49). 
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to enforce congressional policy, but the Court also relied on 
inherent presidential power: "[T]here is no question of 
inappropriate delegation of legislative power involved here. The 
exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right 
to do so stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in 
the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation. 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 lU .S. 304; Pong 
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713. \\'hen Congress 
prescribes a procedure concerning the admissibility of aliens, it is 
not dealing alone with a legislative power. It is implementing an 
inherent executive power. " 154 That is a strange passage. If 
executive power were truly inherent, on what ground could 
Congress pass legislation? 
In this case, a dissent by Justice J acksont pushed back 
against the assertion of inherent presidential power. He found no 
evidence that Congress had authorized "an abrupt and brutal 
exclusion of the wife of an American citizen without a hearing." 155 
He said the administration told the judiciary "that not even a 
court can find out why the girl is excluded." 1511 To Jackson, the 
claim that evidence of guilt "must be secret is abhorrent to free 
men, because it provides a cloak for the malevolent, the 
misinformed, the meddlesome, and the corrupt to play the role of 
informer undetected and uncorrected." 157 He added: ''Security is 
like liberty in that many are the crimes committed in its name." 15x 
He would have directed the Attorney General "either to produce 
his evidence justifying exclusion or to admit Mrs. Knauff to the 
country." 1Y1 
In a military tribunal case decided in 1950, the Supreme 
Court discussed legal challenges being brought against the 
"conduct of diplomatic and foreign affairs, for which the President 
is exclusively responsible. United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 .... " 160 A deportation case in 1952 cited 
Curtiss- Wright but nevertheless recognized the role of the 
154. U.S. ex rei. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 33X U.S. 537, 542 (1 <)50). 
155. !d. at 550 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
156. !d. at 551. 
157. !d. 
15X. !d. 
159. !d. at 552. 
160. Johnson v. Eiscntragcr, 339 lJ.S. 763, 7XlJ (1950). 
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legislative branch in deciding policy in this area. Aliens "remain 
subject to the plenary power of Congress to expel them under the 
sovereign right to determine what noncitizens shall be permitted 
to remain within our borders. " 1 ~'>1 
In the Steel Seizure Case of 1952, a concurrence by Justice 
Jackson observed that the most that can be drawn from Curtiss-
Wright is the intimation that the President ''might act in external 
affairs without congressional authority, but not that he might act 
contrary to an Act of Congress. " 162 Here he found support not on 
broad inherent or plenary presidential power in external affairs 
but on limited implied power and shared power by Congress and 
the President in external affairs. He noted that "much of the 
[Justice Sutherland] opinion is dictum.'' 163 In 19Rl, a federal 
appellate court also cautioned against placing undue reliance on 
"certain dicta'' in Justice Sutherland's opinion: "To the extent that 
denominating the President as the 'sole organ' of the United 
States in international affairs constitutes a blanket endorsement 
of plenary Presidential power over any matter extending beyond 
the borders of this country, we reject that characterization." 164 
This case represents a rare example of a lower federal court 
attempting to place limits on Supreme Court dicta about 
presidential power. 
A right to travel case in 1965 cited Curtiss-Wright to 
uphold the authority of the Secretary of State to restrict travel to 
Cuba. 165 Inherent presidential power was not at issue. The case 
turned on the Court's recognition that Congress, when it 
delegates legislative power to the President, "must of necessity 
paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in 
domestic areas." 166 Several Justices in the Pentagon Papers Case 
in 1971 referred to Curtiss-Wright. A concurrence by Justice 
Potter Stewart, joined by Justice Byron White, described the 
President's power in national defense and international affairs as 
161. Carlson v. Landon, :142 U.S. 524,5:14 (1952). 
162. Youngstown ShL:ct & TubL: Co. v. Sawyer, J4J U.S. 579, 6]6 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, 
J ., concurring). 
16:1. !d. 
IM. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2J 4:10, 4JX n.6 (D.C. Cir. 
19X I). 
165. Zemel v. Rusk, JXI U.S. I, 17 (1965). 
166. !d. 
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''largely unchecked by the Legislative and Judicial branches," 
citing four cases, one of them Curtiss-Wright. 167 Nothing in John 
Marshall's sole-organ speech in 1800 provides support for that 
understanding. Another concurrence by Justice Thurgood 
Marshall claimed that Curtiss-Wright gives the President "broad 
powers by virtue of his primary responsibility for the conduct of 
our foreign affairs and his position as Commander in Chief." 16s Of 
course that relies not on the decision in Curtiss- Wright, upholding 
the delegation of legislative power, but on erroneous dicta by 
Justice Sutherland. A dissent by Justice John Harlan quoted John 
Marshall's speech in 1800 ("The President is the sole organ of the 
nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with 
foreign nations") and remarked: "From that time, shortly after 
the founding of the Nation, to this, there has been no substantial 
challenge to this description of the scope of executive power." 169 
Had Harlan taken time to read Marshall's speech, he would have 
seen a powerful and substantial challenge to that description of 
presidential power. 
A year after the Pentagon Papers Case, Justice Rehnquist 
announced the judgment of the Court in a case involving the 
expropriation of property in Cuba. He first cited a case from 1918 
that recognized that the conduct of the foreign relations of our 
Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive 
and Legislative-'the political'-Departments ... " 17° Certainly 
that is the plain textual meaning of Articles I and II of the 
Constitution. Having discussed concurrent power, Rehnquist then 
proceeded down the opposite path by citing Curtiss-Wright and 
quoting from Marshall's sole-organ speech to buttress the point 
that the executive branch has "exclusive competence" in the field 
of foreign affairs. 171 Of course Marshall said precisely the 
opposite: that President John Adams was using extradition 
authority granted him by treaty. 
167. N<.:w York Tim<.:s Co. v. Unit<.:d Stat<.:s, 403 U.S. 713, 727 (1971) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
16X. !d. at 741 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
169. !d. at 756 (Harlan, J ., dissenting). 
170. First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuha, 406 U.S. 759,766 (1972) (citing 
Cktjen v. C<.:ntral Leather Co., 24h U.S. 297,302 (191X)). 
171. !d. (citing United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937)). 
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In 1975, Rehnquist relied on Curtiss- Wright to argue that 
the limits on the authority of Congress to delegate its legislative 
power are "less stringent in cases where the entity exercising the 
delegated authority itself possesses independent authority over 
the subject matter." 172 Why confuse the need for delegating 
legislative authority if the President already has "exclusive 
competence" in foreign affairs? In a dissenting opinion in 1977, 
again relying on Curtiss- Wright, Rehnquist maintained the 
President occupies a "pre-eminent position ... with respect to our 
Republic," particularly "in the area of foreign affairs and 
international relations." 173 A footnote borrows extensively from 
Justice Sutherland's dicta in Curtiss-Wright, including this 
sentence: "As Marshall said in his great argument of March 7, 
1800, in the House of Representatives, 'The President is the sole 
organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole 
representative with foreign nations."' 174 As explained in Section 
X, John Marshall rejected preeminent power for the President in 
foreign affairs not only as a Member of Congress in 1800 but as 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
In a treaty termination case decided in 1979, Justice 
Powell relied on Curtiss- Wright to argue that Congress may grant 
the President wider discretion in foreign policy than in domestic 
affairs. 175 In that same case, Justice Rehnquist (joined by Chief 
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Stevens) cited Curtiss-
Wright for the more sweeping proposition that the judiciary 
should decline to decide political questions involving "foreign 
relations-specifically a treaty commitment to use military force 
in the defense of a foreign government if attacked.'' 176 Here the 
argument is not for the President's exclusive competence in 
foreign affairs but for judicial deference to national policy decided 
by both elected branches. A year later, in a concurrence, 
Rehnquist cited Curtiss- Wright to observe that delegations of 
legislative authority are upheld "because of the delegatee's 
residual authority over particular subjects of regulation,'' and that 
172. United States v. Mazurie, 41l) U.S. 544, 556~57 (1975). 
173. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 550-51 n.6 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
174. /d.at551n.6. 
175. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. l)%, 1001 n.l ( llJXO). 
176. /d. at 1003~04; see also 1004~05. 
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in the area of foreign affairs Congress (quoting from Justice 
Sutherland in Curtiss- Wright) ''must often accord to the President 
a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction 
which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone 
involved.'' 177 
In 1981, in a case involving the revocation of an American 
citizen's passport, Chief Justice Burger relied in part on dicta from 
Curtiss- Wright that the President "'has his confidential sources of 
information. He has his agents in the form of diplotnatic, consular 
and other officials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered by 
them may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it 
productive of harmful results. " 17x Burger next cited Chicago & 
Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp. (1948), 17 l) which 
argued not for exclusive presidential power in foreign affairs but 
for judicial deference to policy developed by Congress and the 
executive branch. 
Also in 1981, Justice Rehnquist wrote fo:r the Court in 
Dames and Moore to sustain President Carter's decision to freeze 
Iranian assets. The decision turned in large part on statutory 
authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (IEEPA), but Rehnquist referred to language in Curtiss-
Wright about the existence of presidential power resulting from a 
statutory grant of authority but with "the very delicate, plenary 
and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the 
federal government in the field of international relations- a 
power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of 
Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental 
power, must be exercised in subordination to 1the applicable 
provisions of the Constitution. " 1xo The Court took note of the fact 
that "Congress has not disapproved of the action taken here .... 
We are thus clearly not confronted with a situation in which 
Congress has in some way resisted the exercise of Presidential 
177. Indus. Union Dt.:p't. v. Am. Pt.:lrokum lnst., 44H U.S. ()07, 6X4 (19HO) (Rehnquisl, 
J ., concurring). 
17X. Haig v. Agee, 453U.S. 2XO, 307-0X (19XI) (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299U.S. at320). 
179. Haig, 453 U.S. at 30X. 
IHO. Damt.:s & Moort.: v. Rt.:gan, 453 U.S. 654,661 (19X1) (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 
at 319-20). 
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authority." 1111 This passage seems to accept a legislative check on 
presidential power in the field of external affairs. 
In 1984, the Court upheld presidential authority under the 
Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA) to limit travel-related 
transactions with Cuba, referring to language in Curtiss- Wright 
about the "traditional deference to executive judgment '[i]n this 
vast external realm.'" 1112 A 1988 decision by the Court concerned 
the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to 
terminate an employee on grounds of homosexuality. The Court 
ruled that a provision of the Administrative Procedure Act 
precluded judicial review of the agency's decision, and reversed 
the D.C. Circuit on that ground. 1113 Again, the issued involved 
statutory policy, not independent presidential power. Concurring 
in part and dissenting in part, 1 ustice O'Connor stated that the 
functions performed by the CIA "lie at the core of "the very 
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole 
organ of the federal government in the field of international 
relations.' United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 
304, 320 (1936 ).'' 1114 In a dissent, 1 ustice Scalia repeated the same 
language, adding the rest of the sentence from Curtiss-Wright: "a 
power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of 
Congress." 1115 
In 1993, the Supreme Court held that neither a statutory 
provision nor Article 33 of the United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees limited the President's power 
to order the Coast Guard to return undocumented aliens, 
intercepted on the high seas, to Haiti. 1116 The Court interpreted 
congressional legislation as granting to the President "ample 
power to establish a naval blockade that would simply deny illegal 
Haitian migrants the ability to disembark on our shores." 1117 
Whether the President's method of returning Haitians posed a 
greater risk of harm to them was considered by the Court as 
"irrelevant to the scope of his authority to take action that neither 
1Xl. Dames, 453 U.S. at 6X7-XX. 
1X2. Regan v. Wald, 46X U.S. 222,243 (19X4) (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319). 
1X3. Webster v. Doc, 4X6 U.S. 592 (19XX). 
1 X4. !d. at 605-06. 
1X5. /d. at 614-15. 
1X6. Sale v. Haitian Ctr. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993). 
1X7. /d. at 1X7. 
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the Convention nor the statute clearly prohibits." Ixx The 
presumption that a congressional statute does not have 
extraterritorial application unless the intent is clear "has special 
force when we are construing treaty and statutory provisions that 
may involve foreign and military affairs for which the President 
has unique responsibility. Cf. United State,\' v. Curtiss- Wright 
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)." 1xl) By citing the case as a whole 
instead of particular pages, it was left unclear how much the Court 
depended on erroneous dicta and a misreading of John Marshall's 
sole-organ speech. 
In 2005, writing for the Court, Justice Thomas decided 
that a plot to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue 
violated the federal wire fraud statute. He said: "In our system of 
government, the Executive is 'the sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations,' United States v. 
Curtiss- Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)." 1l)0 In 
making that statement, he did not conclude that the President 
possessed exclusive or plenary authority over foreign affairs. 
Instead, Congress had authority to pass the legislation and the 
President could elect to bring the prosecution. 
A year later, the Court held that President George W. 
Bush lacked authority to create military tribunals to try 
individuals who gave assistance to the terrorist attacks on 9/11. To 
the Court, the tribunals violated both the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice and the four Geneva Conventions signed in 
1949. 1l) 1 In a dissent, Justice Thomas said the Court "openly flouts 
our well-established duty to respect the Executive's judgment in 
matters of military operations and foreign affairs." 1l)2 It was the 
Court's "duty to defer to the President's understanding of the 
provision at issue here," a duty "only heightened by the fact that 
he is acting pursuant to his constitutional authority as 
Commander in Chief and by the fact that the subject matter of 
Common Article 3 calls for a judgment about the nature and 
I KK. It!. at 1 KK. 
1K9. It!. 
llJO. Pasquantino v. U nit~:d Stat~:s, 544 U.S. :14lJ, :1fll) (2005). 
Jl)l. Hamdan v. Rumsfcld. 54K U.S. 557 (2006). 
192. !d. at 67K (Thomas, J ., diss~:nting). 
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character of an armed conflict. See generally United States v. 
Curtiss- Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).'' 1'>:< 
In 2009, a unanimous Court held that the Republic of Iraq 
under applicable law was no longer subject to suit in American 
courts. 1l)4 Part of congressional policy authorized the President to 
suspend certain provisions of the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia said: ''To a layperson, the 
notion of the President's suspending the operation of a valid law 
might seem strange. But the practice is well established, at least in 
the sphere of foreign affairs. See United States v. Curtiss- Wright 
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 322-324 ( 1936) (canvassing 
precedents from as early as the 'inception of the national 
government')." 1l)5 Justice Scalia also noted: ''in the 'vast external 
realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold 
problems,' Curtiss- Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S., at 319, courts 
ought to be especially wary of overriding apparent statutory text 
supported by executive interpretation in favor of speculation 
about a law's true purpose."'% Here the focus is on joint action by 
the legislative and executive branches. 
In 2011, the Supreme Court denied the request of the 
executive branch to stay the execution of a Mexican national in 
expectation that Congress would pass remedial legislation. To the 
Court: "we are doubtful that it is ever appropriate to stay a lower 
court judgment in light of unenacted legislation." 1l)7 Justice 
Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, 
objected that the Court should have deferred to the executive 
branch, claiming the Court "has long recognized the President's 
special constitutionally based authority in matters of foreign 
relations. See e.g., United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp., 
299 U.S. 304,320,57 S.Ct. 216,81 L.Ed. 255 (1936)." 1lJx 
193. /d. at 71X-1lJ. For a hricf reference to Curtiss-WriRht, sec Boumcdicnc v. Bush, 
553 U.S. 723,796-97 (200X). 
194. Rcpuhlic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. X4X (2009). 
195. /d. at X56-57. 
196. /d. at X60. 
197. Garcia v. Texas, 131 S.Cl. 2X66, 2X6 7 (20 II). 
19X. /d. at 2X70 (Breyer, J ., dissenting). 
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IX. SCHOLARLY EVALUATIONS OF 
CURTISS-WRIGHT DICTA 
Scholars who have studied Curtiss-· Wright have 
thoroughly repudiated Justice Sutherland for his careless and 
false mischaracterization of the sole-organ speech in 1800, an 
erroneous understanding of the process of treaty negotiation, and 
misunderstanding the shift of sovereign authority to the United 
States after the break with Great Britain in 1776. In a 1938 article, 
Julius Goebel, Jr., of the Columbia Law School evaluated some of 
the principal tenets of Sutherland's opinion. Before turning to 
Curtiss- Wright, he observed that a "certain amount of history is 
implicit in the study of constitutional law," but that the teaching 
of the subject in law schools "has tended toward the abandonment 
of the historical element" in order to provide room for what he 
called "the dialectic urge" to analyze cases, including "balance 
sheets, valuation charts and the profundities of economic 
theory." 1 <J<J 
In the classroom, a law professor "can, as usually he must, 
assume that the student comes armed with at least a citizen's 
knowledge of American government and history.'' This 
supposition, Goebel said, is "quite unsupported in fact, but it has 
acquired the force of an irrebuttable presumption of law."200 
Whether justified or not, the assumption "enables the teacher to 
maintain his propositions of doctrine in appropriate aloofness and 
detachment from political history." Constitutional cases, "drained 
of historical significance," may then be more easily "manipulated 
as so many capsules of legal essence. "201 
Goebel reviewed what Justice Sutherland in Curtiss-
Wright said about America's war of independence after 1776: "As 
a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies acting 
as a unit the power of external sovereignty passed from the crown 
not to the colonies severally but to the colonies in their collective 
and corporate character as the United States of America. "202 In a 
footnote, Goebel pointed out that although Sutherland cited 
Penhallow v. Doane's Adm., 3 Dall. 54, 80-81 (1795), nothing in 
llJlJ. Julius Gm:hcl, Jr., Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 3X COLUM. L. 
REV. 555,555 (llJ3X). 
200. !d. at ))fl. 
201. /d. 
202. /d. at571 (citing Curtiss-Wright, 2()() U.S. 304, 31fl (llJ3fl)). 
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that opinion supported Sutherland's position. In fact, the Court in 
1795 agreed that states did exercise what Justice Iredell called 
"high powers of what I may perhaps with propriety for distinction 
caJl external sovereignty."2m Furthennore, the treaty with Great 
Britain on September 3, 1783, acknowledged the "said United 
States viz. New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island etc. 
to be free sovereign and independent States. '' 204 To Goebel, 
Sutherland's view of sovereignty "passing from the British crown 
to the union appears to be a perversion of the dictum of Jay, C.J. 
in Chisholm's Executors v. Georgia, 3 Dall. 419, 470 (U.S. 1799) 
to the effect that sovereignty passed from the crown to the 
people. "205 
As to Sutherland's statement in Curtiss- Wright that the 
President "alone negotiates" treaties and that into this field "of 
negotiation the Senate cannot intrude," Goebel regarded that 
position as a misleading description of presidential authority in 
foreign affairs, pointing to early examples of Presidents consulting 
the Senate before negotiation.206 Goebel took Sutherland to task 
for ignoring "the theory of control over foreign affairs both before 
and under the Confederation. "207 Instead, Sutherland chose "to 
frame an opinion in language closely parallel to the description of 
royal prerogative in foreign affairs in the Ship Money Case." 20x 
Goebel's footnote to this British case from 1637 explores the 
king's exclusive control over external affairs, a theory of 
government that the American Framers considered and 
rejected.20Y Goebel did not analyze Sutherland's understanding of 
John Marshall's sole-organ speech in 1800. 
A law review article in 1944 by James Quarles expressed 
surprise that, up to that point, Curtiss-Wright "seems not to have 
attracted especial notice" in professional journals.210 Quarles did 
note, however, that Justice Sutherland raised questions that were 
not considered ''by counsel for either side, either in the District 
203. !d. at 571 n.46. 
204. !d. 
205. ld. at 572 n.46. 
206. /d. at 572 n.47. 
207. /d. at 572. 
20X. /d. at 572-73. 
209. /d. at 573, n.50. Sl:c also FISHER, supra note 56, at 5, 73-74, 261-65. 
210. James Quarles, The Federal Government: As to Forei~n Affairs, Are Its Powers 
Inherent as Distin~uishedfrom Dele~atni?, 32 GEO. L.J. 375,375 (1944). 
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Court or in the Supreme Court; nor is there any allusion to any 
issue of that sort in the opinion of the District Judge. Indeed, the 
pages of Mr. Justice Sutherland's opinion devoted to a discussion 
of that question appear to the present writer as being little, if any, 
more than so much interesting yet discursive obiter. ''211 
Another analysis of Curtiss- Wright published in 1944 is by 
C. Perry Patterson, professor of government at the lJ niversity of 
Texas. After describing Sutherland's position that external 
sovereignty passed from the British Crown not to the states but 
directly to the Union, and that the Union existed before the 
Constitution, Patterson stated that Sutherland's doctrine of 
"inherent powers whether in internal or external affairs is (1) 
contrary to American history, (2) violative of our political theory, 
(3) unconstitutional, and ( 4) unnecessary, undemocratic, and 
dangerous. "212 In Patterson's view, states were sovereign and 
independent before ratification of the Constitution.213 The 
colonies, not the Continental Congress, voted for independence 
from Great Britain.214 In that sense, Paterson concluded that 
Sutherland's doctrine in Curtiss-Wright that Congress "acquired 
power over the entire field of foreign affairs as a result of the issue 
of the Declaration is contrary to the facts of American history. "215 
Patterson did not analyze Sutherland's understanding of treaty 
negotiation or the sole-organ speech by John Marshall. 
Two years later, in an article for Yale Law Journal, David 
M. Levitan wrote more broadly about the implications of Curtiss-
Wright for constitutional government, explaining how Sutherland 
borrowed some of the positions he advanced while a U.S. Senator 
from Utah. 216 In an article he wrote called "The Internal and 
External Powers of the National Government," printed as a 
Senate document, Sutherland argued that the power over external 
affairs was never possessed by the states but came directly to the 
211. /d. at 37X. 
212. C. Perry Patterson, In Re the United States v. The Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 22 
TEX. L. REV. 2X6, 2lJ7 ( 1lJ44). 
213. /d. 
214. /d. at 304-05. 
215. /d.at30K 
216. David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice 
Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 472-7X (1lJ46). 
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national government.217 Of course that position has been rejected 
by many scholars, as noted above in this section. After leaving the 
Senate, Sutherland was invited to deliver a series of lectures at 
Columbia University, where he reiterated the same theme about 
external sovereignty.21 x 
After reviewing this material from Sutherland's Senate 
career and im1nediately after, Levitan explained that he provided 
extensive detail to demonstrate the pattern between those 
positions and his authorship of Curtiss-Wright: "Not only is there 
a consistency as to ideas, but in fact quotation of language. Few 
men indeed are in the happy position of being able to give their 
writings and speeches the status of the law."219 Comparing 
Sutherland's career before he joined the Court and his decision 
on presidential power in 1936 led Levitan to say: ''[T]he whole 
theory and a great amount of its phraseology had become 
engraved on Mr. Sutherland's mind before he joined the Court, 
waiting for the opportunity to be made the law of the land. "220 
Levitan did not reject Sutherland's theory in Curtiss-
Wright simply because it dovetailed with earlier positions: "It is 
only to be expected, and even to be hoped, that justices should 
give expression to carefully thought out ideas." 221 Yet when 
analyzing the validity of Sutherland's theory of external relations 
and presidential power, Levitan concluded that the facts did not 
support Sutherland. For example, the "record of events leaves no 
doubt that treaty-making power was exercised by the States."222 
Sutherland's theory that the power of external sovereignty 
passing from the Crown not to individual colonies but to the 
colonies in their "collective and corporate capacity as the United 
States of America" did not, to Levitan, "harmonize with the facts. 
It simply was not so. "223 Sutherland's theory "of the nature of the 
foreign relations power represents the most extreme 
interpretation of the powers of the national government. It is the 
217. /d. at 473-75,473 n.l7 (citing S. Doc. No. 417, nlst Cong., 2d Scss. (1909)). The 
date of the Senate document is actually 1910. 
21X. /d. at 475. 
219. /d. at 476. 
220. !d. at 47X. 
221. /d. 
222. /d. at 4X5. 
223. /d. at 4X9. 
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furthest departure from the theory that [the] United States is a 
constitutionally limited democracy. It introduces the notion that 
national government possesses a secret reservoir of 
unaccountable power. "224 Sutherland's doctrine of external affairs 
"makes shambles out of the very idea of a constitutionally limited 
government. It destroys even the symbol."225 
In the Yale Law Journal in 1973, Charles A. Lofgren 
analyzed Sutherland's understanding in Curtiss- H-'right when he 
spoke of "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the 
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field 
of international relations."220 Lofgren read John Marshall's words 
"to put them in context. "227 Marshall explained to his colleagues 
in the House of Representatives that the President "is charged to 
execute the laws," a treaty ''is declared to be law,'' and it was 
therefore the duty of President Adams to carry out the extradition 
provision in the Jay Treaty.2211 Under Lofgren's reading, it was 
"difficult to extract from Marshall's comments an endorsement of 
unlimited executive discretion in foreign policy-making."229 
National policy had been established by the President and the 
Senate acting jointly through the treaty-making process, not by 
the President alone. 
Moreover, Lofgren concluded that Sutherland had 
"uncovered no constitutional ground for upholding a broad, 
inherent, and independent presidential power in foreign 
relations. "230 Americans in 1936 "probably accorded Congress a 
coordinate, if not a dominant, role in the initiation of war, whether 
declared or not," and control of commercial policy "was largely 
assigned to Congress. "231 To Lofgren, Marshall "evidently did not 
believe that because the President was the sole organ of 
communication and negotiation with other natiollls, he became 
the sole foreign policy-maker."232 Sutherland's opinion in Curtiss-
224. /d. at 4lJ3. 
225. /d. at 4lJ7. 
226. Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Expnrt Corporation: An 
1/istorica/ Reassessment, K3 Y i\LF L.J. I, 24 (1lJ73). 
227. /d. 
22K. /d. at 25. 
22lJ. /d. (emphasis in original). 
230. /d. at 30. 
231. /d. 
232. /d. 
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Wright "does not support the existence of an extra-constitutional 
base for federal authority, broad independent executive 
authority, or laxness in standards governing delegation. It 
certainly invests the President with no sweeping and independent 
policy role. '' 2 ~~ 
During the I ran-Contra hearings in 1987, the sole-organ 
doctrine of Curtiss-Wright was alluded to at times. For example, 
Rep. Henry Hyde asked an administration witness, Bretton G. 
Sciaroni, whether Congress could use its power of the purse ''to 
cut off, restrict or an1end the President's constitutional powers to 
be the supreme spokesman for America in foreign policy, the sole 
operator? Can the power of the purse amend the constitutional 
powers of the President?" Sciaroni replied: "I don't believe so."234 
Shortly after that, Senator George Mitchell said to Sciaroni: 
''Now, Representative Hyde read to you a section from the 
Supreme Court case known as Curtiss Wright." Mitchell asked 
Sciaroni if the language about the President being "sole organ" 
was dictum. Sciaroni answered that he would have to look at the 
opinion to make that determination. Mitchell stated: "When you 
do so, I believe you will find it was dictum, it was not relevant to 
the decision and it has no binding effect, as all dictum does not."235 
The Iran-Contra report contains a section that raises 
numerous objections to Justice Sutherland's analysis in Curtiss-
Wright. The report denied that anything in John Marshall's speech 
supported inherent and exclusive presidential power. Instead, he 
regarded the President as simply carrying out the law on the basis 
of authority granted by statute or treaty.236 The minority views in 
the report interpreted Curtiss- Wright to empower the President 
to exercise inherent and independent powers in the field of 
foreign affairs.237 
The explanation by Senator Mitchell may have wide 
acceptance in the legal community, but the record is quite clear 
233. /d. at 32 (emphasis in original). 
234. Iran-Contra Investif.!,ation:, Part W0-5, Joint Ilearing,· BefrJTe the S. Select Comm. 
on Secn:t Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the H. Select 
Comm. to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. 100th Cong., 1st Scss. 421 
(li.JX7). 
235. /d. at 426. 
2311. H. R. REP. No. 100-433, S. REP. No. 100--216, lOOth Cong .. 1st Scss. 3XX-I.JO 
( II.JX7). 
237. !d. at472-74. 
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that various administrations have resorted to the sole-organ 
doctrine to justify expansive definitions of presidential power. 
That has been the pattern in litigation on Zivotof5ky. Section XI 
of this article analyzes the extent to which the Justice Department 
depends on Curtiss- Wright dicta to advocate an exclusive and 
plenary role for the President in the field of international affairs. 
Michael Glennon, writing in the Yale Journal of 
International Law in 19~~, referred to the "'extravagant scheme 
concocted by Justice George Sutherland, first unveiled in his 
earlier writings and later, in 1936, transposed into a Supreme 
Court opinion, and unleashed upon the nation in United States v. 
Curtiss- Wright Export Corp."23x Sutherland discussed the "sole 
organ" statement by John Marshall "with no reference to its 
limiting context."239 After quoting Sutherland's language in 
Curtiss-Wright that the President possesses not only authority 
delegated to hin1 by Congress but also "the very delicate, plenary 
and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the 
federal government in the field of international relations,'' 
Glennon remarks: "The first thing to be said about this 
breathtaking exegesis concerning 'plenary powers' is that it is the 
sheerest of dicta." 240 To Glennon, Curtiss- Wright "is demonstrably 
not a plenary powers case" because such power "is one that is not 
susceptible to congressional limitation." Plenary power refers to 
the "exclusive presidential power to act without regard to 
congressional action."241 But, as Glennon notes, President 
Roosevelt in Curtiss-Wright acted on the basis of statutory 
authority conferred by Congress. Sutherland's opinion is 
described as ''a muddled law review article wedged with 
considerable difficulty between the pages of United States 
Reports."242 Moreover, his interpretation of the sole-organ speech 
"mistakes policy communication for policy formulation." 243 
David Gray Adler, in a 1988 article, states that it is "quite 
likely that Curtiss-Wright is the most frequently cited case 
21K. Michael .1. (!lennon, Two Vit>ws of Presidential Fort'iKn Affairs Powa: Little v. 
Barrcmc or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE .1. INT'L L. 5, 11 (19KK). 
239. /d. at 12. 
240. /d. 
241. /d. 
242. /d. at 13. 
243. /d. at 14. 
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involving the allocation of foreign affairs powers."244 After 
deciding that the delegation by Congress of authority to the 
President was not unduly broad, Justice Sutherland ''strayed from 
the delegation question and in some ill-considered dicta imparted 
an unhappy legacy, the chimerical idea that the external 
sovereignty of the nation is vested in the presidency and is neither 
derived from nor restrained by the Constitution." His theory of 
inherent presidential power "stems from his bizarre reading of 
Anglo-American legal history."245 Adler found no factual 
foundation for Sutherland's assertion that domestic and foreign 
affairs are different, "both in respect of their origin and nature," 
and that external sovereignty somehow passed directly from the 
Crown to the President when in fact it passed to the colonies as 
sovereign entities.246 
As for the sole-organ speech, Adler explains that John 
Marshall was merely defending the decision of President John 
Adams to surrender to Great Britain a British deserter, acting 
under the Jay Treaty. At no point in the speech did Marshall 
"argue that the president's exclusive authority to communicate 
with a foreign nation included a power to formulate or develop 
policy."247 By misinterpreting Marshall's speech, Sutherland 
attempted to infuse ''a purely communicative role with a 
substantive policy-making function. "24x It appeared to Adler that 
"the sole organ doctrine is simply so much fanciful rhetoric. "249 
A biography of Justice Sutherland in 1994 by Hadley 
Arkes concentrates on Sutherland's jurisprudence anchored in his 
understanding of natural rights. Part of that discussion is devoted 
to Sutherland's position on presidential power in the field of 
foreign policy. As to the embargo policy at issue in Curtiss-Wright, 
Arkes states: "In the strictest sense, Congress did not choose to 
legislate in this case."250 In fact, as Arkes notes, Congress in 1934 
"passed a joint resolution that authorized the president to bar the 
244. David Gray Adler, The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking· The Enduring 
Dehate, 103 POL. SCI. Q. I, 30 (19XX). 
245. /d. 
246. /d. 
247. ld. at 33. 
24X. /d. at 34. 
249. /d. 
250. HADLEY ARKES, TIH'-: RETURN OF CiEORGE SUTHERLAND: RLSTORING A 
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194 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 31:149 
sale of arms and munitions" to Bolivia and Paraguay.251 Yet he 
said the action of Congress ''did not have the solemnity and the 
properties of a statute," even though it passed both houses, was 
presented to the President, and signed into law.252 
As to Justice Sutherland's decision in Curtiss-Wright, 
Arkes claims that the separate states after 1776 "never enjoyed 
the attributes of sovereignty in international relations" and the 
power of external sovereignty passed from the Crown directly to 
the United States.253 As indicated in this section, a number of 
scholars have produced evidence to refute that position. Arkes 
cites language that the President "alone negotiates" treaties and 
into that field the ''Senate cannot intrude," without recognizing 
that Presidents in the past had invited Senators to join in the 
negotiation of treaties and that Sutherland in his 1919 book 
admitted that Senators had done precisely that. 254 A.rkes refers to 
Marshall's "sole organ" speech in 1800, but does not analyze the 
speech to understand that Marshall was not arguing for exclusive 
and plenary power of the President in foreign affairs. 255 
Despite numerous scholarly cntiques that have 
highlighted Justice Sutherland's errors and misconceptions, an 
article in 1996 by Anthony Simones correctly observes that 
''judges have utilized Curtiss- Wright to sanction a broad range of 
presidential powers. "25 (1 After reading the repudiations of 
Sutherland's work, Simones expected the decision to be "tossed 
into the dust bin of constitutional jurisprudence" along with Dred 
Scott v. Sandford and Plessy v. Ferguson. Instead, Curtiss- Wright 
remains a source of authority in deciding cases. "Most judges 
don't seem to care about the historical basis of Justice 
Sutherland's theory and don't recall the specific facts of the 
case. "257 
Writing in 2000 in the William and Mary Law Review, 
Michael D. Ramsey described Curtiss- Wright as "demonstrably 
251. /d. 
252. /d. at 204. 
253. /d. at 201. 
254. /d. at 204. 
255. /d. 
256. Anthony Simoncs, Tfw Reality of Curtiss-Wright, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 411 
( Jl)l)() ). 
257. /d. at 415. 
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wrong as a historical matter, and it is wrong for reasons that have 
escaped the central focus of many attacks upon it. "251\ He 
concentrated not on the issue of states exercising sovereign 
power, the sole-organ doctrine, or the treaty negotiation process, 
but instead on Justice Sutherland's decision to wrongly describe 
the understanding of those who drafted and ratified the 
Constitution. At that time, there was ''no theory of 
extraconstitutional power in foreign affairs" and it was 
understood that the Constitution provided "the means to give the 
national government foreign relations power it would otherwise 
lack."25 l) The "truly radical part of Curtiss-Writ?ht is not its 
emphasis on presidential power, but rather its claim that that 
power arose outside the Constitution."200 To that extent, Curtiss-
Wright "is historically indefensible. "261 Ramsey rejected 
Sutherland's position that the field of foreign affairs relies on 
"inherent powers. "262 
Also writing in 2000, Roy E. Brownell I I analyzed the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of Curtiss- Wright. 263 He did not 
question the accuracy of Glennon's description of Justice 
Sutherland's decision as "a muddled law review article wedged 
with considerable difficulty between the pages of the United 
States Reports.'' 264 With regard to Sutherland's language 
regarding "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the 
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field 
of international relations-a power which does not require as a 
basis for its exercise an act of Congress," Brownell offered this 
appraisal: "Anyone making even the most cursory glance at 
constitutional text will conclude that it is difficult to fashion a 
theory under which Curtiss- Wright's 'plenary' powers statement 
could be justified."265 The notion that Congress may be excluded 
2.SH. Michad D. Ramsey, The Myth of l:'xtraconstitutional Forei,.;n Affairs Power, 42 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 37<J, 3XI (2000). 
259. !d. 
260. !d. at 3X2. 
261. !d. at437. 
262. !d. at 444. 
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Youngstown Sheet & Tuhe v. Sawyer in National St'curity Jurisprudence, 16 J.L. & POL'Y. 
I, 21-42 (2000). 
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from national security affairs, "as implied by Curtiss-Wright's 
'plenary/sole organ' passage, clearly does violence to the text of 
the Constitution."2116 Although Brownell refers to John Marshall's 
speech in 1800 describing the President as ''sole organ" of the 
nation in external affairs?)7 he does not offer a judgment whether 
Sutherland misrepresented what Marshall said. 
In a report for the Law Library of Congress in August 
2006 and a journal article published the following year, I 
explained that Marshall's speech did not support an independent, 
extra-constitutional or exclusive power of the President in foreign 
relations. The concept of an executive having sole power over 
foreign relations borrows from other sources, including the 
British model of a royal prerogative that gave the king plenary 
power over external affairs.m.; The Framers rejected that model. 269 
My book on Presidential War Power includes a section that 
identifies the false history and theory promoted by Justice 
Sutherland's dicta in Curtiss-Wright. 270 Similarly, my 2014 legal 
treatise on the executive branch devotes several sections to 
misconceptions about presidential inherent power, treaty 
negotiation, and the "sole organ" doctrine. 271 On July 17, 2014, I 
submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Zivotofsky v. 
Kerry, pointing to errors and misconceptions in Curtiss-Wright 
and requesting the Court to issue corrections.272 
In 2009, H. Jefferson Powell published a detailed analysis 
of Curtiss-Wright. 273 He provided important background on the 
Gran Chaco War in South An1erica, the political context of 
President Roosevelt's involvement in the arms embargo, the 
266. !d. at 41. 
267. !d. at IY. 
26H. Louis Fishl:r, The "Sole OrJ.:an" Doctrine, Law Lihrary of Congrl:ss, Aug. 2006, 
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271. FISHER, supra note 5o, at oX-73, 265-oH, 272-7o, 2Xo. 
272. Brief of Louis Fishn as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Zivolofsky v. 
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legislation passed by Congress, the ensuing criminal prosecution, 
positions taken by opposing parties in the litigation, and 
Sutherland's political and legal background before joining the 
Supreme Court.274 As to the decision in Curtiss-Wright, Powell 
explains that part of it was "a direct reprise" of Sutherland's work, 
Constitutional Power and World Affairs, and summarized 
"chapters two and three" of the book.275 The famous passages 
about the President as "sole organ" in international relations, with 
exclusive control over treaty negotiation and possessing "plenary 
and exclusive power," Powell says, were "unparalleled'' in 
Sutherland's earlier writings and lectures.276 He further notes: ''no 
one embraces Sutherland's cherished theory about the twofold 
nature of federal power and the opinion probably doesn't make 
sense without the theory."277 
Although Powell cites some critics of Curtiss-Wright, 27x he 
does not indicate whether he agrees with their evaluations. He 
says that critics describe Sutherland's quotation of John Marshall 
about the President as "sole organ'' as "a cheat- all Marshall 
meant was that foreign governments communicate with the 
United States through the president, not that the president 
decides what to say or do in response. "279 A footnote has this 
parenthetical to an article by Powell: "the critics are right about 
the meaning of the 'sole organ' passage in Marshall's speech but 
that Marshall nevertheless thought the president enjoys 
independent policymaking authority over foreign affairs."2xo The 
purpose of Marshall's speech was to reject calls for the 
impeachment or censure of President Adams, pointing out that 
Adams acted on the basis of authority granted him in the Jay 
Treaty. Section X explains Marshall's position about presidential 
power when he served as Chief Justice. 
In 2013, Edward A. Purcell, Jr. published an article that 
analyzed Curtiss- Wright not so much for historical misconceptions 
in its dicta but the possible influence of Chief Justice Hughes in 
274. /d. al 196-220. 
275. /d. aL221. 
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promoting '"plenary and exclusive" power for the President in 
foreign affairs. Justice Sutherland authored the opinion, but 
Purcell maintains it went far beyond what Sutherland had written 
as a U.S. Senator or in the book he wrote in 1919, where he 
emphasized that the roles of Congress and the President in foreign 
affairs were "co-ordinate. "2111 In his book, Sutherland highlighted 
the Senate's authority ''to participate in the making of treaties at 
any stage of the process," including the negotiation phase.2112 
Purcell asks: "Why was Sutherland willing to change his own long-
held views on foreign affairs powers in order to assert the 'plenary 
and exclusive' nature of the executive's power?"211~ 
To Purcell, the ''plenary and exclusive" language "most 
likely came not from Sutherland but from Chief Justice Charles 
Evans Hughes, and that Hughes was the architect of both the 
Court's 7-1 majority and the opinion's executive power 
language. "2114 He further argues that the majority Justices "likely 
accepted" Hughes' views to provide "practical support for 
President Franklin Roosevelt in his contemporaneous struggle 
with Congress over the nation's foreign policy, especially his 
efforts to implement an anti-Nazi foreign policy and to secure 
discretionary authority over arms embargoes."2115 Because Hughes 
had been U.S. Secretary of State from 1921 to 1925 and author of 
many books on law and international affairs, as well as a judge on 
the Permanent Court of International Justice,21111 in foreign affairs 
"he readily understood the need for executive independence and 
discretion.2117 If Hughes ''had urged the 'plenary and exclusive' 
executive power language on the justices, his exhortation would 
have carried great weight. "21111 Although this expansive language 
"differed substantially" from anything Sutherland "had 
2Hl. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Understanding Curtiss-Wright, 31 LAW & HIST. REV. 
653, 6fd (2013) (citing Sutherland's book, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD 
AFFAIRS at 50-69, 76-7H, 91, 99, 110, 122-2HO). The word "co-ordinate" appears in 
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2H2. Purcell, supra note 2H I, at 661. The language about the treaty process appears in 
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2H6. /d. at 667. 
2X7. !d. at 66H. 
2XX. ld. at 676. 
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previously articulated," Purcell concludes that Sutherland 
deferred to Hughes on this point.2w) 
Purcell does not say this, but if Sutherland was willing to 
accept the language from Hughes, that may have led Hughes to 
tolerate the abundant dicta that Sutherland added to his opinion, 
including Sutherland's account of John Marshall's sole-organ 
speech in 1800. Purcell does not analyze whether Sutherland 
misinterpreted what Marshall actually said once the entire speech 
is read. When Marshall became Chief Justice a year later, he used 
several opportunities to make it abundantly clear that presidential 
powers in external affairs are limited by congressional 
constitutional and statutory authority. 
X. MARSHALL'S CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION AS 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
At no time in John Marshall's lengthy public career did he 
promote plenary and exclusive presidential power over foreign 
affairs. No one who read the text of Articles I and II of the 
Constitution could possibly advance such a doctrine. In his 
capacity as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from 1801 to 1835, 
he insisted that the making of foreign policy is a joint exercise by 
the executive and legislative branches, acting through treaties and 
statutes. The President did not possess inherent authority. 
Blackstone's theory of external relations, the British royal 
prerogative, and the concept of independent executive power in 
foreign affairs did not appear in Marshall's decisions. With the 
war power, for example, Marshall looked solely to Congress-not 
the President-for the authority to take the country to war against 
another power and to place constraints on the President's actions 
as Commander-in-Chief. 
Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the Court in Talbot v. 
Seeman, a case involving salvage of the ship Amelia during the 
Quasi-War with France.290 Part of the decision turned on the war's 
undeclared nature. A series of statutes passed by Congress 
authorized President John Adams to use military force against 
France, but there had been no formal declaration of war. The 
previous year the Court in Bas v. Tingy decided that Congress 
2HlJ. !d. at 710. 
2lJO. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1H01 ). 
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could authorize hostilities either by formal dec1aration or by 
statutory authority.2l) 1 
In Talbot, the captain of a U.S. ship of war captured a 
merchant ship that the French had earlier seized. The owner of 
the ship sued the captain. Chief Justice Marshall ruled in favor of 
the captain. To decide the case, it was necessary to examine the 
relationship between the United States and France at the time. To 
do that, Marshall looked for constitutional guidance to statutory 
policy: "To determine the real situation of America in regard to 
France, the acts of congress are to be inspected.'''2n He had no 
difficulty in identifying the branch of government authorized to 
settle this issue of external affairs: "The whole powers of war 
being by the constitution of the United States, vested in congress, 
the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this 
enquiry. "2l)3 
In Little v. Barrenze (1804 ), Chief Justice 1\.1arshall ruled 
that when a presidential proclamation issued in time of war is 
contrary to a statute passed by Congress, the statute prevails. As 
part of legislation involving the Quasi-War, Congress authorized 
the President to instruct naval commanders to stop, examine, and 
seize suspected U.S. ships "sailing to any port or pllace within the 
territory of the French republic or her dependencies .... ''2l)4 
President Adams issued a proclamation directing naval 
commanders to stop and examine ships sailing "to, or from" 
French ports.2l)5 Marshall ruled that presidential! "instructions 
cannot change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act 
which without those instructions would have been a plain 
trespass."2Yh Speaking for a unanimous Court, Marshall regarded 
the statute as superior to the proclamation. In Zivotofsky, the 
D.C. Circuit not only deferred to the executive branch (which 
Marshall did not) but held that an agency manual- the State 
Department's Foreign Affairs Manual-was superior to a statute. 
In one section of Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice 
Marshall distinguished between two types of presidential action: 
2'-JI. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (IXOO). 
2'-J2. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 2l). 
2l)3. !d. at 2X. 
2'-J4. h U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177 (1X04) (emphasis in original). 
2'-J.'i. !d. at 17X. 
2%. !d. at 17'-J. 
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one that is independent of judicial control and another that is 
governed by statute. Under the Constitution, the President "is 
invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of 
which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to 
his country in his political character and to his own conscience."2'~7 
With regard to political matters that do not affect individual 
rights, "the decision of the executive is conclusive. '' 2'~x 
However, when Congress proceeds by statute to impose 
on an executive officer "other duties; when he is directed 
peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the rights of 
individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts; he is 
so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his 
conduct; and cannot, at his discretion sport away the vested rights 
of others. "2l)l) In cases where a "specific duty is assigned by law, 
and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, 
it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself 
injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a 
remedy."300 Under these conditions, the executive officer's duty is 
to the law, not to the President. Following Marshall's reasoning, 
the statutory rights of private parties in Zivotofsky should prevail 
over the conflicting policies contained in a State Department 
manual. 
XI. EXECUTIVE BRANCH RELIANCE 
ON CURTISS-WRIGHT 
Different levels of the executive branch, including the 
Justice Department, the State Department, and the White House, 
depend heavily on dicta in Curtiss- Wright to expand presidential 
power at the cost of traditional checks and balances. In 1941, 
Attorney General Robert Jackson described the opinion, issued 
on December 21, 1936, as "a Christmas present to the 
President."301 Executive branch attorneys turn to the decision 
with great frequency. As noted by Harold Koh, Justice 
Sutherland's "lavish description of the president's powers is so 
2()7. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1X03). 
2lJX. /d. at 166. 
2lJ9. /d. 
~00. /d. 
~01. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY 
OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 201 ( 1941 ). 
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often quoted that it has come to be known as the 'Curtiss-Wright, 
so I'm right' cite- a statement of deference to the president so 
sweeping as to be worthy of frequent citation in any government 
foreign-affairs brief. "302 
In signing a bill in 2002 that contained language on 
Jerusalem passports, President George W. Bush stated that if 
Section 214 were construed to impose a legislative requirement, it 
would "impermissibly interfere with the President's constitutional 
authority to formulate the position of the United States, speak for 
the Nation in international affairs, and determine the terms on 
which recognition is given to foreign states."303 The language 
implicitly, if not explicitly, borrows from Curtiss- Wright dicta. 
First, we treat as law what appears in a statute, not what is 
said in a signing statement.304 Second, the remarks by President 
Bush highlight a number of widespread misconceptions. He said 
that Section 214 would "impermissibly interfere with the 
President's constitutional authority to formulate the position of 
the United States." Formulation of public policy in external 
affairs is a constitutional duty assigned to both elected branches, 
as the Justice Department acknowledged in its brief to the 
Supreme Court in February 2014: Congress ''also possesses the 
power to regulate passports pursuant to its enumerated 
powers. "305 The Justice Department added that the Constitution 
"provides that the two Branches exercise some foreign-affairs 
powers jointly. '' 30h 
Third, President Bush said that Section 214 interferes with 
the President's authority to "speak for the Nation in international 
affairs," an apparent allusion to John Marshall's "sole organ" 
speech in 1800. But as pointed out by scholars discussed in Section 
IX of this article, the authority to speak and comn1unicate is not 
the authority to make policy over external affairs. Policy 
302. HAROLD HONGJU KOH. THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING 
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR Y4 (1 <NO). 
303. Statement on Sif.ininf.i the Foreif.in Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Y car 2003, 
2002 PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: GEORGE W. BUSH 1!1Y7, 
l!lYK (Sept. 30, 2002), cited hy the Justice Department in its Brief for the Respondent in 
Opposition at !1, supra note K3. 
304. DaCosta v. Nixon, 55 F.R.D. 145, 14!1 (E.D. N.Y. 1Y72); FISHER, supra note 5!1, 
at IYI--9!1. 
305. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, supra note K3, at 10. 
3(Jh. !d. at 13. 
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communication is separate from policy formulation. The two 
elected branches share in the formulation of policy. The President 
communicates it. 
Fourth, the signing statement by President Bush claimed 
that Section 214 interferes with the President's authority to 
"determine the terms on which recognition is given to foreign 
states,'' suggesting that the recognition power is vested solely in 
the President under Article II of the Constitution. There is no 
evidence that the Framers vested the recognition power in the 
President, ''and certainly not a power that is plenary in nature."307 
Yet according to the Justice Department in its February 2014 
brief, from "the Washington Administration to the present, the 
Executive Branch has asserted sole authority to determine 
whether to recognize foreign states and governments, as well as 
their territorial boundaries, and Congress has acquiesced in that 
understanding. "30x 
The Justice Department appropriately selects the verb 
"asserted,'' but assertions are merely that. They fall short of 
evidence. They represent only a claim by one party. In this case, 
the assertion by the Justice Department is itself incorrect. The 
historical record amply demonstrates that Presidents have not 
consistently claimed exclusive recognition power and Congress 
has not acquiesced in that assertion. 
Contrary to the Justice Department claim, President 
George Washington was more modest and circumspect about his 
power over foreign affairs, including the recognition power. When 
Washington recognized the new French revolutionary 
government, he did not rely on broad theories of Article II power 
or the existence of plenary, inherent, and exclusive presidential 
control over external affairs. Instead, he followed the law of 
nations and Vattel's doctrine of de facto recognition. If a 
government was in "actual possession" of the instruments of 
national power, it was "entitled to be recognized by other 
states. "309 Washington issued his Neutrality Proclamation, 
warning U.S. citizens that they faced prosecution for acting 
307. Robert J. Reinstein, RecoJ.;nition: A Case Study on the OriJ.;inal UndastandinJ.; of 
Executive Power, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. i-101, i-162 (2011). 
30K. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, supra note KJ, at 14. 
JOY. Robert J. Reinstein, Executive Power and the Law of Nations in the WaslzinJ.;ton 
Administration, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 373,424 (2012). 
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against the law of nations by becoming involved in hostilities 
against nations at war. 310 
Washington then discovered the limits of independent 
executive power. Although individuals were prosecuted by the 
administration, indicted by grand juries, and all with the support 
of federal judges, jurors objected to finding someone guilty of a 
crime that lacked a statutory basis. Washington's initiative 
smacked too much of monarchical powers rejected by the 
Framers. On a regular basis, jurors returned a verdict of not 
guilty. 311 Facing this pattern of acquittals, Washington turned to 
Congress for statutory authority, supplied by the Neutrality Act 
of 1794.312 
In place of the Justice Department narrative, it is more 
accurate to say that Congress has also exercised the recognition 
power and that Presidents have acquiesced in that legislative 
judgment. The historical evidence in the post-ratification period 
from Washington to the present time does not support a plenary 
recognition power in the President. Executive recognition 
decisions "are not exclusive but are subject to laws enacted by 
Congress.''313 The Justice Department correctly notes that in a 
number of cases the Supreme Court has deferred to executive 
branch determinations over recognition power.314 Unlike 
Congress, the federal judiciary is not assignedl an array of 
constitutional powers over external affairs and foreign policy. 
Acquiescence by the Supreme Court does not require 
acquiescence by Congress. 
In September 2014, the Justice Department filed with the 
Supreme Court its "'Brief for the Respondent" in Zivotofsky? 15 It 
stated: "'The principle that the Nation must speak with one voice 
in foreign affairs, see United States v. Curtiss- Wright Exp. Corp., 
299 U.S. 304, 319-320 ( 1936 ), therefore applies with particular 
force to recognition decisions."316 The reference to Curtiss- Wright 
310. !d. at 430 n.267. 
311. !d. at 43lJ. 
312. !d. at 440. 
313. Rohert J. Reinstein, Is the President's RecoRnition Power fjxclusive'!, K6 TEMP. 
L. REV. I, 60 (2013). 
314. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, supra note K3, at 19-20. 
315. U.S. Justice Department, "Brief for the Respondent," Zivowf.\'ky v, Kerry, U.S. 
Supreme Court, No. U-62K, Sept. 2014. 
316. !d. at 9. 
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is the first of nine citations by the Justice Department to this 
decision.317 Even when not citing Curtiss-Wright, the Department 
makes repeated arguments that the President has "sole power" to 
conduct foreign relations,31 x act as "sole organ" in foreign 
relations,31 l) and the requirement that the United States speak with 
"one voice" in foreign affairs,320 with that voice being the 
President's. The Department does not explain why the voice to 
state public policy is the san1e voice that makes public policy. 
The Department's reading of the Constitution lacks 
credibility and persuasive force for several reasons. First, it is 
contradicted by other statements in the Department's brief that 
recognize that the Constitution provides for shared power 
between the two elected branches in making foreign policy. The 
Department acknowledges what is obvious by simply reading the 
text of the Constitution and the operation of government over 
more than two centuries: the field of external relations is shared 
between the legislative and executive branches. Instead of the 
President possessing plenary and exclusive power, the 
Department's brief explains that the President has instead "broad 
authority to conduct the Nation's foreign relations."321 
Conducting policy is not the same as making it. The Department 
recognizes that Congress "may enact passport legislation in 
furtherance of its enumerated powers. "322 Congress, states the 
Department, "may regulate foreign commerce and the value of 
foreign currency," declare war, and define and punish offenses 
"against the Law of Nations."323 Those powers are expressly 
granted to Congress, undermining any possible argument that the 
President has plenary and exclusive power over external affairs. 
The Department recognizes other legislative powers in 
foreign affairs. Congress "has the authority to regulate passports 
in furtherance of its enumerated powers, including its powers over 
immigration and foreign commerce."324 It "has unquestioned 
317. The eight other references to Curtiss-Wright appear at 10, 1X, 21, 24 (three 
times), 53, and 54. 
31 X. !d. at {}-10. 
31 (}. I d. at 25. 
320. /d. at 10, 13, 26. 
321. /d.at(}. 
322. /d. at 11. 
323. /d. at 22 n.5. 
324. /d. at 45. 
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authority to legislate on certain matters affecting foreign 
affairs. "325 The Department's insistence that the President provide 
the "'sole organ'' and "one voice" in external affairs would 
subordinate Congress to executive power. The Constitution 
anticipates that the two elected branches shall often adopt 
conflicting policies for foreign affairs, with no branch superior to 
the other. History supports this pattern of shared power. 
In a subsection called ''The Reception Clause confers 
recognition powers on the President," the Departn1ent offers this 
argument: "The primary source of the President's recognition 
power is Article Il's grant of authority to the President alone to 
'receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers.' lJ.S. Canst. 
Art. II, § 3. '' 326 The recognition power is thus implied, not 
expressly stated. Congress has an implied power to make passport 
policy. The issue is therefore the need to resolve two competing 
implied powers, not discover plenary and exclusive power of the 
President. 
In citing constitutional language that directs the President 
to receive Ambassadors and other public 1ninisters, the 
Department does not cite constitutional language in Article II, 
Section 3, that immediately follows: "he shall take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed .... '' President Bush signed the bill 
containing the Jerusalem passport provision and the bill became 
Pub. L. No. 107-228. He had a duty to carry out Section 214(d). 
His signing statement, raising constitutional objections, does not 
operate as an item veto, enabling the President to carry out some 
provisions but not others. That interpretation would give the 
President an absolute veto instead of the qualified veto granted 
by the Constitution. 
XII. A PARTIAL CORRECTION IN ZJVOTOFSKY 
In Zivoto.fsky v. Kerry, the Supreme Court corrected the 
sole-organ erroneous dicta that had magnified presidential power 
in external affairs for 79 years. Writing for the Court, Justice 
Anthony Kennedy reviewed the position of Secretary of State 
John Kerry, who urged the Court to define executive power over 
325. /d. at 5X. 
326. /d. at 13. 
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foreign affairs in broad terms, relying on language in Curtiss-
Wright that described the President as "the sole organ of the 
federal government in the field of international relations. "327 In its 
response, the Court said it ''declines to acknowledge the 
unbounded power. ... The Curtiss- Wright case does not extend so 
far as the Secretary suggests. "32x 
As explained in this section, the Court decided not to 
address a number of related issues and created a new model that 
could expand presidential power. There are numerous 
deficiencies in the Court's opinion. First, it never clarified how the 
statutory issue at question had anything to do with the President's 
recognition power. Second, it did not acknowledge that when the 
D.C. Circuit in Zivotofsky upheld presidential power it relied five 
times on erroneous dicta in Curtiss-Wright. Therefore, readers 
would not understand the legal significance of the sole-organ 
doctrine in this case. Third, the Court did not explain how Justice 
Sutherland flagrantly misrepresented the speech by John 
Marshall in 1800 when he served in the House of Representatives. 
Fourth, the Court left in place Sutherland's erroneous dicta about 
the President possessing the sole power to negotiate treaties. 
Fifth, the Court did not cite scholarly articles that from 1938 to 
the present time regularly attacked Curtiss- Wright for its errors 
about presidential power. Sixth, the Court relied on stereotypes 
to define the power of the President. Seventh, it appeared to 
recreate a variant of the sole-organ doctrine with the President 
speaking with "one voice," offering "unity at all times," and 
speaking "for the Nation." Eighth, it created an unrealistic model 
of presidential unity that the executive branch can invoke in 
future disputes to elevate the President over Congress. These 
eight points shall now be elaborated. 
WHAT DID §214(D) HAVE TO DO WITH RECOGNITION 
POWER? 
The basic holding in Zivoto.f\·ky is that the President "has 
the exclusive power to grant formal recognition to a foreign 
sovereign. "32Y It ruled in favor of an exclusive presidential power 
327. Zivotofsky ex rd. Zivotofsky v. Kerry,!]) S. Ct. 207(), 2mN (2015). 
32X. !d. 
329. !d. at 207X. 
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over recognition and held invalid §214( d) of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, which authorized 
parents of children born in Jerusalem to ask American Embassy 
officials to list the place of birth as ''Israel" on passports. As the 
Court explains in Section I.A of its decision, when President 
Harry Truman in 1948 recognized the State of Israel he explained 
that his statement did not recognize Israeli sovereignty over 
Jerusalem.330 No President after Truman "issued an official 
statement or declaration acknowledging any country's 
sovereignty over Jerusalem. "331 
The Court acknowledged that the statement required by 
Section 214( d) ''would not itself constitute a formal act of 
recognition."332 A page later, however, the Court stated that the 
purpose of Section 214( d) "was to infringe on the recognition 
power-a power the Court now holds is the sole prerogative of 
the President. ''·133 To the Court, the statutory provision 
represented "a mandate that the Executive contradict his prior 
recognition determination in an official document issued by the 
Secretary of State. "334 Following that reason, the Secretary of 
State would permit the placement of "Jerusalem" on a passport's 
place-of-birth section, but not "lsrael."335 The administration 
could have avoided litigation simply by having the State 
Department record Israel on passports while explaining that the 
U.S. position has not changed in leaving the issue of sovereignty 
over Jerusalem to the Israelis and the Palestinians. 
Four Justices concluded that Section 214(d) had nothing 
to do with the recognition issue. In an opinion concurring in part 
and dissenting in part, Justice Clarence Thomas said "no act of 
recognition is implicated here."33n A dissent by Chief Justice John 
Roberts, joined by 1 ustice Samuel Ali to, stated that "the statute 
at issue does not implicate recognition."337 A dissent by Justice 
Antonin Scalia, joined by Roberts and Alita, said:: ''To know all 
330. /d. at 20X I. 
:Bl. !d. 
332. /d. at 20lJ5. 
333. /d. 
334. /d. 
335. /d. 
336. /d. at 2111 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
337. /d. at 2114 (Roberts, C.J.,joined hy Alito, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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this is to realize at once that §214( d) has nothing to do with 
recognition. Section 214(d) does not require the Secretary to 
make a formal declaration about Israel's sovereignty over 
Jerusalem. "33x 
OVERLOOKING ERRONEOUS DICTA IN CURTISS-WRIGHT 
In deciding the case, the Court in Zivoto.f~'ky provided 
little context for analyzing the sole-organ doctrine. It did not 
acknowledge that when the D.C. Circuit in Zivotofsky upheld 
presidential power it relied five times on Curtiss-Wright dicta. 
Referring to that legal history would have helped readers 
appreciate why the Court found it necessary to confront, and 
jettison, the sole-organ doctrine. Those details are set forth in 
Section I of this article. 
In his dissent in Zivoto.f~'ky, Chief Justice Roberts 
highlights the degree to which the executive branch depended on 
Curtiss-Wright dicta: ''The Solicitor General invokes the case no 
fewer than ten times in his brief. " 339 To provide necessary 
background for analyzing the constitutional issue in Zivotof\'ky 
and how it was resolved, references to those essential 
documentary materials deserved being included in the opm1on 
issued by the majority. 
IGNORING THE SOLE-ORGAN SPEECH 
In deciding to reject the sole-organ doctrine, the Court 
would have done that more credibly by explaining how Justice 
Sutherland wholly misrepresented what Marshall said in his 
speech in 1800. A speech needs context, as explained in Section 
IV of this article. Why did the Court decide to omit that basic and 
relevant analysis? Was it considered inappropriate to point an 
accusing finger at a particular Justice and underscore the failure 
of his colleagues to double-check Marshall's language to make 
sure it was being properly cited? Would such an explanation 
discredit the Supreme Court as an institution capable of 
constitutional interpretation? Surely it is of interest that the Court 
in 1936 chose to mischaracterize the speech of someone who a 
year later would be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. As 
33X. /d. at 211 X (Scalia, J ., joined hy Roherts, C.J ., A lito, J. disst:nting). 
339. /d. at 2115 (Roherts, C.J., joined hy Alito, J. dissenting). 
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explained in this article, the record is clear that at no time in his 
service in Congress or on the Supreme Court did Marshall 
endorse a theory that gave the President "'plenary and exclusive" 
authority over external affairs, as Sutherland clairned in CurtL\\5-
Wright. The record is clearly otherwise and Section X makes that 
clear. 
RETAINING ERRONEOUS DICTA 
Although the Court in Zivotofsky rejected the claim in 
Curtiss- Wright that the President possessed "unbounded power'' 
in external affairs,340 it left in place other erroneous dicta from 
Justice Sutherland. For example, the Court in Zivotofsky stated 
that the President has ''the sole power to negotiate treaties, see 
United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 
( 1936) .... "341 Sutherland was entirely wrong tha1t the President 
"makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he 
alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot 
intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. "342 As 
explained in Section III, Sutherland knew from his twelve years 
in Congress that Senators are involved in treaty negotiation. 
Moreover, members of the House are often invited by President 
to participate in treaty negotiation to build political support for 
authorization and appropriation bills needed to implement 
treaties. 
No matter how often the facts about the treaty negotiation 
process are set forth in scholarly works,343 explaining the close 
involvement of Senators and Representatives, the erroneous dicta 
in Curtiss- Wright about treaty negotiation- given new life by the 
Court's decision in Zivotofr.;ky-will heavily influence legal and 
public debate about constitutional issues. The apparent rule: if 
something appears in a Supreme Court decision, no matter how 
egregiously in error, it provides fully adequate authority. The 
executive branch exploits these judicial errors to promote 
presidential power. In 2009, the Office of Legal Counsel cited 
]40. /d. at 20?\lJ. 
]41. /d.at20k6. 
]42. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. al ]ll) (emphasis in 
original). 
]4]. For example. supra note 64. 
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"clear dicta" in Curtiss-Wright that "[i]nto the field of negotiation 
the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to 
invade it.'' 344 Clear dicta? No doubt about that. Also clearly 
erroneous dicta? True as well, but those who assume that what 
the Court says is always correct and reliable would not know one 
issue from the other. 
The extent to which Supreme Court errors mislead public 
discussion of constitutional issues is reflected in an article by Steve 
Coli in The New Yorker, published on April27, 2015. He criticized 
47 Senate Republicans for sending an open letter to Iranian 
leaders about negotiations to cap Iran's nuclear program in 
exchange for lifting economic sanctions. Coli sought support from 
Curtiss-Wright, which he described as "a thumping endorsement 
of a President's prerogative to lead foreign policy."345 He 
proceeded to add this language from Curtiss-Wright: "In this vast 
external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and 
manifold problems," giving only the President "the power to 
speak or listen as a representative of the nation .... He alone 
negotiates'' and in this field Congress is "powerless'' to intrude.346 
Not only can OLC, reporters, and others continue to cite 
this erroneous dicta in Curtiss-Wright, but they can refer to the 
Court's fresh endorsement in Zivotofsky that this error remains a 
valid and binding source of constitutional authority. How many 
other professions, such as medicine and engineering, make an 
error 79 years ago and continue to rely on it, no matter how often 
studies highlight the error and point to needless deaths and 
bridges falling down? 
In Zivotof\'ky, the Court chose to pay no attention to 
another error in Curtiss-Wright that has received extensive 
attention by scholars from l93R to the present time. It concerns 
Sutherland's claim that the two categories of external and internal 
affairs are different "both in respect of their origin and nature. "347 
The principle that the federal government is limited to either 
enumerated or implied powers "is categorically true only in 
344. Office of Legal Counsel, supra note flfl, at 9. 
345. Steve Coli, Dan)ierous Gamesmanship, THE NEW YORKER, April 27, 2015, at 
19. 
34h. /d. 
347. 299U.S.at315. 
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respect of our internal affairs. "34K By arguing that external and 
foreign affairs were transferred directly to the national 
government and then associating foreign affairs with the 
executive, Sutherland advanced a broad definition of inherent 
presidential power in external affairs. Section I I I explains why 
Sutherland's theory is false, even though it provides a breeding-
ground for unchecked presidential power over foreign policy. The 
Court in Zivotof.\·ky should have analyzed and corrected all of the 
erroneous dicta in Curtiss- Wright, examining the decision root 
and branch, not simply correcting one error and ignoring others. 
They are all intertwined. 
The inability of the Court to understand the scope and 
interrelationship of erroneous dicta in Curtiss-Wright is reflected 
elsewhere in Zivotofsky. In discussing why it was necessary to 
reject the sole-organ doctrine, it discussed earlier decisions in 
United States v. Belmont and United States v. Pink. regarding the 
decision by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to recognize the 
Soviet government of Russia. Without the slightest misgiving or 
awareness, the Court writes: "In these matters, 'the Executive 
ha[s] authority to speak as the sole organ ofth[e] government."' 34 l) 
Of course that is the very dicta the Court was supposedly rejecting 
in Zivotofsky. 
IGNORING SCHOLARLY CRITIQUES OF CURTISS-WRIGHT 
Nowhere in Zivototsky does the Court refer to scholarly 
articles that regularly punctured, from 1938 to 2014, the erroneous 
dicta in Curtiss- Wright about presidential power. At times the 
Court cites work by Robert Reinstein, Louis Henkin, Julius 
Goebel, Saikrishna Prakash, and Michael Ramsey, but only on the 
recognition power.350 At one point the Court includes a reference 
to an article by Michael Glennon to support this constitutional 
principle: "It is not for the President alone to deterrnine the whole 
content of the Nation's foreign policy.''351 Readers of Zivotofsky 
would not know that Glennon was highly critical of the erroneous 
dicta in Curtiss- Wright. As explained in Section IX, regarding 
34X. !d. at 316. 
349. Zivotofsky ex rei. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 20X9. 
350. !d. at 20X5, 20X7, 2090,2092,2093,2097. 209X, 2099,2010,2114,2016---17. 
351. !d. at 2090. 
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scholarly evaluations of Curtiss- Wright dicta, Glennon regarded 
Sutherland's opinion as an "extravagant scheme concocted" to 
promote presidential power and resembled a "muddled law 
review article." 
CREATING PRESIDENTIAL STEREOTYPES 
The Court in Zivotof\'ky borrowed language from 
Alexander Hamilton's Federalist No. 70 to broadly define the 
scope of presidential power: with ''unity comes the ability to 
exercise, to a greater degree, '[ d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and 
dispatch. "'352 The Court cites those four qualities as though they 
are inherently positive in nature, meriting support for broad 
presidential power in foreign affairs. It failed to understand the 
damage that can come to constitutional government by vesting 
exclusive power in a President who acts unilaterally with 
"decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch." 
One need only recall these presidential initiatives from 
1950 to the present time: President Truman ordering U.S. troops 
in Korea to travel northward, prompting the Chinese to introduce 
their forces and resulting in a costly stalemate; President 
Johnson's decision to escalate the war in Vietnam; President 
Reagan's involvement in Iran-Contra, leading to prosecution of 
those involved and nearly in his impeachment; President Bush in 
2003 using military force against Iraq on the basis of six claims 
that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction -six 
claims found to be entirely empty; and President Obama ordering 
military action against Libya in 2011, leaving behind a country 
broken legally, economically, and politically, providing a 
breeding-ground for terrorism.353 
In relying on Federalist No. 70, the Court ignored 
Hamilton's warning in Federalist No. 75 about unchecked 
presidential power. He noted that several writers had placed the 
power to make treaties "in the class of executive authorities,'' but 
to Hamilton "it will be found to partake more of the legislative 
than of the executive character, though it does not seem strictly to 
fall within the definition of either of them. "354 Speaking more 
352. /d. at 20Xfl. 
353. LOUIS FISHER, supra note 270, at 100-03, 132--37, 209-32, 2JX-47, 2XO-XX. 
354. BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, cJ., THE FEDERALIST 476 (2002 cJ.). 
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broadly about the realm of foreign affairs, he cautioned: "The 
history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion 
of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit 
interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which 
concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole 
disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a 
President of the United States. "355 
In his dissent in Zivotof~·ky, Justice Scalia objected that 
the Court's decision "does not rest on text or history or 
precedent." Instead, it relies on "functional considerations," such 
as the Court's assertion that the Nation must speak "with one 
voice'' about the status of Jerusalem. To Scalia, the "vices of this 
mode of analysis go beyond mere lack of footing in the 
Constitution. Functionalism of the sort the Court practices today 
will systematically favor the unitary President over the plural 
Congress in disputes involving foreign affairs. "356 That leads to the 
next question: did the Court in Zivotofsky endorse a model of 
presidential power that bears close similarities to Sutherland's 
sole-organ doctrine? 
FASHIONING A NEW PRESIDENTIAL MODEL 
In dismissing the administration's plea for a President who 
acts as "sole organ" in the field of foreign affairs, the Court in 
Zivotof,·ky created a variant that seem close cousin, without 
grounding it in any constitutional text. It states that recognition is 
a topic on which the Nation must '"speak ... with one voice,"' and 
that voice "must be the President's. "357 The citation here is to the 
Court's decisions in Garamendi (2003), quoting Crosby (2000)?5s 
Neither decision had anything to do with independent 
presidential power in foreign affairs, cut free from congressional 
control. Instead, both cases concerned efforts by states to interfere 
with national policy. Crosby involved a Massachusetts law that 
barred state entities from buying goods or services from 
companies doing business with Burma. Congress later imposed 
355. !d. at 477. 
356. Zivotofsky ex rei. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 2123 (Scalia J., dissenting) 
(emphasis in original). 
357. !d. at 20X6. 
35X. American Ins. Assn. v. Ciaramendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003} (quoting Croshy v. 
Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 3X1 (2000)). 
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mandatory and conditional sanctions on Burma. A unanimous 
Court held that the state act was preempted by congressional 
statutory policy.359 The decision did not elevate the President over 
Congress in external affairs. Jnstead, the Court declared: "A 
fundamental principle of the Constitution is that Congress has the 
power to preempt state law."360 The President was operating on 
statutory authority, not on independent executive power. 
The Massachusetts law on Burma represented ''an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's full objectives 
under the federal Act. "361 The Court explained that the legislation 
passed by Congress "intended the federal Act to provide the 
President with flexible and effective authority over economic 
sanctions against Burma. "362 The President was therefore 
operating on the basis of statutory authority, not independent 
executive power. In that sense, the President was acting under 
Justice Jackson's first category in his Youngstown concurrence: 
"When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it 
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that 
Congress can delegate. "363 
Crosby then adds: "See also id., at 635-36, n. 2 (noting that 
the President's power in the area of foreign relations is least 
restricted by Congress and citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).'' The Court in Crosby did not 
pursue what Jackson said in Note 2, but it is illuminating to do so 
here. He correctly explained that Curtiss- Wright "involved, not 
the question of the President's power to act without congressional 
authority, but the question of his right to act under and in accord 
with an Act of Congress. "364 The Court in Zivotof~·ky makes the 
same point that Curtiss-Wright "dealt with congressionally 
authorized action, not a unilateral Presidential determination." 365 
359. Croshy v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
360. /d. at 372. 
361. /d. at373. 
362. !d. at 374. 
363. /d. at 375 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tuhe Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 
(1952)). 
364. Youngstown Sheet & Tuhe Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, <135 n.2 (1952). 
365. Zivotofsky ex rei. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 2090. 
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Jackson's Note 2 probed further. He said that dicta in 
Curtiss- Wright "recognized internal and external affairs as being 
in separate categories, and held that the strict limitation upon 
congressional delegations of power to the President over internal 
affairs does not apply with respect to delegations of power in 
external affairs." He said that in Curtiss-Wright it was "intimated 
that the President might act in external affairs without 
congressional authority, but not that he might act contrary to an 
Act of Congress. "366 That is the precise result reached by the 
Court in Zivotof\'ky, holding that the President possessed 
exclusive control over the recognition power and could therefore 
act contrary to *214(d). 
ASSERTING PRESIDENTIAL UNITY 
Having cited Crosby for the proposition that the Nation 
must "speak ... with one voice'' and that voice "must be the 
President," the Court in Zivotofsky made this claim: "Between 
the two political branches, only the Executive has the 
characteristic of unity at all times. "367 The Court cited no authority 
to support that assertion. Those who follow the operations of the 
federal government might be amused-or bemused-in their 
search for unity in the presidency, even within the same 
administration. They are more likely to see a confusing pattern of 
zigs and zags. 
The Court in Zivotofsky appears to be influenced by such 
presidential scholars as Clinton Rossiter, Arthur rvl. Schlesinger, 
Jr., Henry Steele Commager, and Richard Neustadt, who built 
their professional careers by arguing that it was politically 
necessary and constitutionally permissible to transfer ever greater 
power to the President. The unpopularity of the Vietnam War 
caused some scholars, including Schlesinger, to rethink the 
wisdom of vesting unchecked power in the executive branch. 
However, this period marked only a momentary pause in the 
general pattern of scholars and the media to lionize the American 
President and manufacture heroic properties, including the 
capacity to act instinctively for the "national interest," 
surrounded by advisers with unrivaled expertise and unerring 
366. Youngstown Sheet & Tuhe Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 635 n.2. 
367. Zivotofsky ex rei. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 20X6. 
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political judgment, and possessing the competence and unity 
necessary to protect the Nation from domestic and foreign 
threats.3nx Those properties are highly imaginary and romantic, as 
witnessed by anyone who reviews the full record of Presidents 
from Truman to Obama. 
Consider the immigration policy of the Obama 
Administration. From 2010 to November 2014, President Obama 
publicly stated that he lacked personal authority to resolve the 
problem of undocumented aliens. On October 25, 2010, he said he 
was President, "not a king," adding that the system of government 
requires that the two elected branches work together: ''I can't just 
make the laws up by myself."369 In subsequent statements over the 
next three years, he continued to make similar announcements, 
explaining that he could not suspend deportations simply by 
issuing an executive order.370 
In June 2012, the Obama Administration unilaterally 
granted deferred action for undocumented aliens who arrived in 
the United States as children (childhood arrivals, or DACA). 
Having extended protection to the ''Dreamers," President Obama 
stated on February 14, 2013, that he was not ''the emperor" and 
had "kind of stretched our administrative flexibility as much as we 
can."371 Nevertheless, following the November 2014 elections, he 
issued a major address to the Nation on November 20, setting 
forth a comprehensive immigration policy to cover about four to 
five million undocumented aliens.372 The matter is now in the 
courts, with the administration losing thus far in district court and 
the Fifth Circuit. The brief by the Justice Department to the Fifth 
Circuit describes the immigration initiative in markedly narrower 
terms than announced by President Obama in his November 20, 
36X. Louis Fisher, Teachin~.: the Presidency: ldealizin~.: a Constitutional Offrce, 45 PS: 
POL. SCI. & POL. 17 (2012), http://loufishcr.org/docs/ci/tcach.pdf. 
369. 161 CONCi. REC. H%2, H%7 (daily co., Fch. II, 2015, placed in the record hy 
Rep. Hill of Arkansas). 
370. /d. 
371. /d. at H%X. 
372. Remarks hy the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration, Nov. 20, 
2014, http://www.whitchousc.gov/issucs/immigrati(m/immigration-action, 3. 
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2014 public address. The contradictions between the brief and the 
presidential statement are quite pronounced.373 
As a final argument in favor of an exclusive recognition 
policy for the President, the Court in Zivoto.f\·ky insists that the 
"'formal act of recognition is an executive power that Congress 
may not qualify. If the President is to be effective in negotiations 
over a formal recognition determination, it must be evident to his 
counterparts abroad that he speaks for the Nation on that precise 
question."374 There should be little doubt that the executive 
branch and advocates for independent presidential power will use 
these vague judicial arguments to advance presidential interests 
over those of Congress in the field of external affairs. As noted by 
Jack Goldsmith, the Court's "untidy reasoning" will invite 
executive branch lawyers to "interpret its pro-executive elements 
for all they are worth. "37) 
CONCLUSION 
It was important, even if long overdue, for the Supreme 
Court to discard the sole-organ doctrine fabricated in Curtiss-
Wright dicta. At the same time, the Court allowed other 
erroneous dicta in that case to continue. In holding that the 
President has the exclusive power to grant formal recognition to 
a foreign sovereign, the Court noted that "Congress has an 
important role in other aspects of foreign policy. "370 That is an 
obvious point for anyone who reads Articles I and II of the 
Constitution and understands events abroad frmn 1789 to the 
present time. 
Zivotofsky v. Kerry presented two rival jurisprudential 
visions. One promotes the President as the sole authority to 
decide national policy regarding U.S. relations with foreign 
nations. That is the theory advanced by the D.C. Circuit, rooted 
in Curtiss-Wright dicta. The competing vision recognizes that 
Congress and the President concurrently exercise power over 
373. Louis Fisher, [)0./'s ArRument in Immigration Case At Odds with the !.aw~and 
Ohama, NAT'L L. J., April 20, 2015, at 35, http://www.loufishn.org/Jocs/pip/ 
immigration5th.pdf. 
374. Zivotofsky ex rd. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 20X7. 
375. Jack Goldsmith, Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the Executive Branch, 12Y HARV. 
L. REV. 112, 146 (2015). 
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external affairs, with neither branch possessing exclusive, plenary, 
or inherent authority. This article has analyzed the sources of the 
first vision, finding them legally hollow and unsound. Because the 
majority opinion in Zivotofs·ky is in many areas carelessly drafted 
and analyzed, it will add unnecessary and unwanted confusion 
about the role of the two elected branches in foreign affairs, most 
likely advancing presidential power over that of Congress. 
